These four Vedas are further divided into two parts, Karma-Kanda and Jnana-Kanda. Karma Kanda is the section dealing with rituals and prayers while Jnana-Kanda deals only with the ontological realities – the nature of world, consciousness (or self) and God known as Brahman in the Vedas

Gilligan argued that females act from concerns about social relationships and that their moral development has elements of compassion and caring strongly built in. On the other hand, according to her, justice dominates men's morality.

The next stage is that of “Autonomous morality”, in which they are able to move beyond the consequences and are able to see morality as linked to intentions and that rules are flexible.

The first stage is that of “Heteronomous morality” in which children are able to see rules as fixed and dictated by authority

both our genetic makeup and the environment we experience would influence our overall development, including our moral development.

AI platforms such as ChatGPT

the Belarus Russia-inspired attempt

l anticipatory diplomacy.

The policy response has been different, too, with the European Union has taken a predictably tougher stance by proposing to bring in a new AI Act that segregates artificial intelligence as per use case scenarios, based broadly on the degree of invasiveness and risk

Do we want a world filled with A. I. systems that are designed to seem human in their interactions with human beings?

Making them bear at least some liability for what their models do would encourage a lot more caution.

liability.

The government needs to do more here than just write up some standards. It needs to make investments and build institutions to conduct the monitoring.

evaluations and audits.

Any firm building A.I. systems above a certain scale should be operating with hardened cybersecurity

security

whether this problem is solvable.

interpretability

China seems perfectly willing to cripple the development of general A.I. so it can concentrate on systems that will more reliably serve state interests.

Should there be an opt-out from A.I. systems?

“you should be able to opt out from automated systems in favor of a human alternative, where appropriate.”

This, too, is essential, but we do not understand these systems well enough to test and audit them effectively.

For now, we have no idea what is happening inside these prediction systems.

But where the European Commission’s approach is much too tailored, the White House blueprint may well be too broad.

“alignment risk,”

Choosing this strategy meant “repeatedly catching on fire, crashing into other boats, and going the wrong way on the track,” but it also meant the highest scores, so that’s what the model did.

Those sets can’t plausibly be free of error, and it’s not clear what it would mean for them to be representative.

“training, validation and testing data sets shall be relevant, representative, free of errors and complete.”

as new A.I. systems have already thrown the bill’s clean definitions into chaos.

That’s where the government comes in — or so they hope.

The United States-India technology corridor will give India the skills, technology, markets, and confidence to become a global player. 

the United States must openly communicate the path for reduced controls toward India, and India should dismantle barriers through exceptions for American technology companies to enable true partnerships to form

Policymakers in the United States and India should both work to reform trade policies and promote an open system of technology transfer and innovation between the two countries.

They must also think in more ambitious terms, planning for massive expansions that would rival China in terms of the size and scope of their factories, fabrications, labs, and operations.

Take India’s Aadhaar, for example, the world’s largest and most sophisticated biometric identification system that remarkably enables efficient and secure payments using just an ID number (compared to the near-century old American Social Security number standard)

India is poised to be an increasingly influential economic actor, and its growth can help compensate for America’s loss of trade with China under re-globalization. 

from one of outsourcing to one of radical collaboration

But by collaborating with American companies and encouraging reciprocal cycles of innovation, more Indian companies can become genuine technological leaders, developing original intellectual property with its deep wells of talent.

In 2020, after a series of border disputes with China, the Indian government banned dozens of well-known Chinese apps, including TikTok, from India.

If India’s technology sector wants to continue expanding and modernizing, public officials in India need to think strategically about India’s relations with international partners in this next stage. 

Thanks to the establishment of technical education through the Indian Institutes of Technology in the 1950s and 60s, India was able to cultivate a large pool of skilled professionals

But when it comes to technology, a sector in which clear decoupling has begun, India must choose which partner it wants to prioritize. 

Trade relations with the United States are important at $100 billion a year but trade with neighboring China is double that

While globalization will continue as normal for certain industries — basic consumer goods where consumer surplus is high and existential risk is low, for example — other sectors are moving toward some degree of decoupling, chief among them technology

It is neither complete interconnection nor complete decoupling, but rather a mix of the two. 

Re-globalization is distinctive from the economic systems which preceded it: During the period before World War I, and then again over the past 30 years, global interconnection was the norm, as goods and services proliferated easily across the world thanks to open markets and favorable regulatory environments.

the most important potential geo-economic partner for the United States today as it “re-globalizes” with greater concern for national security and resilience.

And as the United States’ concerns about China grow, India shines as a promising alternative in supply chains, innovation hubs, and joint-ventures.

the BRICS are looking to progressively develop and encourage the production of medicines and vaccines, with the aim of eventually breaking away from their dependance on Western pharmaceutical companies

Xi now wants the club to expand and admit Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia and Argentina.

The two countries signed a total of 15 agreements, covering technology, satellites, semiconductors, 6G, artificial intelligence, internet expansion, climate, tourism, investments in clean energy, and other strategic sectors

The two countries signed a total of 15 agreements, covering technology, satellites, semiconductors, 6G, artificial intelligence, internet expansion, climate, tourism, investments in clean energy, and other strategic sectors.

the Moscow-backed International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometere network of trains, roads and sea routes to connect Russia to India through Iran and Central Asia.

the maiden India-Central Asia Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting on Chabahar in Mumbai

The risk is that this coming together deepens the estrangement of the global south from the international order. It would be a tragic result if, in uniting the West, America alienates the rest.

China can undermine the effectiveness of global institutions

Western unity to hold

It will prioritise relations with its core democratic allies in Europe and Asia (which it hopes might one day include India)—and then try to maintain creaking global institutions in order to mediate meet the needs of a broader group of countries, including most non-aligned ones, whether on development, debt relief, security or finance.

Chinese visitors bring loans and engineers while Americans bring playlists.

“Countries don’t want to choose, and we don’t want them to,” Jake Sullivan, Mr Biden’s national security adviser

AidData also finds that a 10% increase in voting similarity with Beijing at the un is associated with an increase in the number of Chinese projects in that country.

Between 2007 and 2020 it provided more infrastructure financing in sub-Saharan Africa than the next eight lenders combined

China is the main trading partner for around 120 countries.

It draws a contrast with the West, which it says prefers smaller clubs (like the g7). “China shows up where and when the West will not,” says Yemi Osinbajo, Nigeria’s outgoing vice-president.

The non-aligned countries want to avoid taking sides.

China offers “hardware”: bridges, roads, ports—and the loans to build them.

West has generally been the preferred source of “software”: support for schooling, health and, should the African government want it, human rights

audi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

Qatar is playing novel diplomatic roles.

Last month Saudi Arabia signed a Chinese-brokered deal with Iran and joined the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, a Eurasian talking shop.

Saudi Arabia,

Turkish exports to Russia reached $7.6bn in 2022, a 45% increase on the previous year.

he “New Turkey” can select its partners.

Turkey also wants to be more influential across the global south

India promises to use its chair of the g20 this year to be the “voice of the global south”.

India

Lula will soon visit Africa to revive Brazil’s influence there.

Brazil is also classed by America as a “major non-nato ally”, a legal status entitling enhanced co-operation with America’s armed forces.

what Mauro Vieira, foreign minister, calls “automatic alignments”.

New research by the imf notes that since 2018 geopolitical alignment, measured by similarity in un voting patterns, has become ever more important in determining the location of foreign direct investment.

ore than a third of Chile’s is with China, a higher share than any other t25 country (but 40% of its trade involves the West).

77% of Mexico’s total trade occurs with the West; over 60% of Israel’s and Algeria’s trade also does.

In Saudi Arabia gdp per person is more than $27,000, on a par with some European countries, while in Pakistan it still lingers around just $1,600.

the world’s largest democracies, India and Indonesia, alongside Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are all run by autocrats of various flavours.

“Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,”

Some $170bn in aid was pledged to Ukraine in the first year of the war—equivalent to about 90% of all the aid spent globally in 2021 by the oecd’s Development Assistance Committee, a group of 31 Western donors.

Some call it “minilateralism” (as opposed to multilateralism)—the use of discrete alliances or groupings to achieve results in dedicated areas, rather than lumping your lot in with one bloc.

These middle powers are pragmatic and opportunistic.

A formal institution, the Non-Aligned Movement, was joined by nearly every African, Asian and Latin American state. With the end of the cold war it became, in the words of an Indian academic, “a moribund organisation in need of a decent burial”.

Today they represent 45% of the world’s population and their share of global gdp has risen from 11% in 1992 to 18% in 2023, more than the eu’s.

the transactional 25 (t25)

the 25 biggest economies that have sat on the fence on the Ukraine war, or wish to remain non-aligned in the Sino-American confrontation, or both.

Although 52 countries comprising 15% of the global population—the West and its friends—lambast and punish Russia’s actions, and just 12 countries laud Russia, some 127 states are categorised as being firmly in neither camp (see map).

This makes the GSB the perfect place to glimpse the future of management.

a certain “selfless ambition”

How do you lay someone off? How do you decline unsolicited and unhelpful advice from a big investor? How do you respond to a nosy journalist?

Only when you know your weaknesses can you act to mitigate them

Students are instructed to observe each other’s behaviour, from emotional expressiveness to problem-solving skills.

assess whether the way they come across to others is the way they want to be perceived.

to hold “multiple overlapping roles” within an organisation, as an assigned reading recommends: it is harder to be defenestrated if multiple teams report to you.

to avoid grooming successors

“insufficient sensitivity to, and skill in, coping with power dynamics” have cost many talented people promotions and even their jobs.

ll three require virtually no number-crunching. Instead they aim to cultivate in students a capacity for hardheadedness, introspection and diplomacy, respectively.

Unless their destruction offers a definite military advantage, data cables intended for civilian data traffic should be protected as civilian objects under humanitarian law.57

Marseille is the central hub for data traffic to the MENA region and Asia, with twelve active or planned systems.34

Cable repair and maintenance is handled by an industry that is separate from the operating and owning companies. Operators and owners enter into ‘contracts with marine maintenance companies that have cable and equipment storage depots and cable ships strategically positioned throughout the world, available on a 24/7 standby basis to repair cable faults.’86

The largest part of the submarine cables is located within the high seas, where there is almost no legal protection provided – besides Art. 113-115 of UNCLOS

Y. Yincan, J. Xinmin, P. Guofu, and J. Wei (Eds.), ‘Safety of Submarine Optical Cable’, Submarine Optical Cable Engineering, 2018, pp. 235–257

Distributed Acoustic Sensing is a ‘technology that enables continuous, real-time measurements along the entire length of a fibre optic cable.’85This technology utilizes the entire optical fibre as the sensing element. These systems allow acoustic signals to be detected over large distances and in harsh environments. They can be used to detect movements and vibrations in the vicinity of the cable, for instance, from shipping activities.

Positions are marked on navigational charts to ensure awareness of marine users.

With an average ocean depth of 3682m51, the 1.3 million km52 of submarine cable infrastructure is installed in a challenging environment.

Countries have full jurisdiction over the cable in their territorial waters, i.e. up to 12 nautical miles (or about 22 kilometres) from the baseline of their coastline. States also have particular law enforcement duties and obligations in the contiguous zone (24nm). States do not have jurisdiction over cables outside those zones. Indeed, on the high seas (the areas outside of national jurisdiction) as well as the Exclusive Economic Zones of states (200 nm), the legal status of cables and rights and responsibility for their protection is ambiguous.82

On average, non-island EU Member States have 4.5 internal cross-border cable systems available.65

a transnational landing station ‘spotting community’ exists that aims to take photographs of landing stations and post their precise location on the internet fora.8

the currently longest cable system SEA-ME-WE-3.

Second, Gozo, the second-largest island of the Maltese Archipelago with 31 000 inhabitants, is connected by only one submarine cable to the local Maltese network.72

extensive power outages that affect both cable landing stations result in loss of connectivity.

ata Centres and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs).

new cable landings of high-capacity projects at the French and Danish West coasts, as well as Bilbao, indicate a change of mindset in the landing location planning.

n the EU, the Netherlands have the most IXP (106), followed by Germany (83), France (35), and Italy (34).

The hotspots of data centre locations within the EU are Frankfurt (54 centres), Amsterdam (41), and Paris (31). Massive clusters of data centres exist in Stockholm (29), Milan (22), Dublin (19), Sofia (20), Madrid (19), Bucharest (19), Copenhagen (17), Riga (17) and Helsinki (17).3

While the information on cable owners is widely available,41 there is little information on the operators and buyers of the capacities

With the recent EllaLink project and the older systems of Atlantis 2 and COLUMBUS III, there are only three direct links between the European Union and Latin America.3

Various critical infrastructures are increasingly dependent on a stable internet connection. Examples of these services can be found in the finance sector (internet-based ATMs), transport sector (coordination systems for to-the-minute supply chains), water and food sectors (digitalised water supply systems and smart agriculture).

CER Directive)

94 % of EU’s businesses have a fixed broadband connection, and 78 % have a website. 41 % of all European enterprises use tools like cloud services that require a permanent internet connection, andfor large enterprises, this share grows to 71 %.19

Article 21(c), 1982.11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 113, 1982

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Alcatel Submarine Networks and Nexans (France), Prysmian Group (Italy), NKT A/S (Denmark), SubCom (United States), NEC (Japan), and Huawei Marine Networks (China).

his is also reflected at the EU level, where a broad range of agencies, including the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European Fishery Control Agency, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, and several Directorates of the European Commission, e.g. DG Connect, DG MOVE, or DG MARE,

here is a tendency to pay little attention to what happens at sea more generally —a phenomenon that has been described as collective sea blindness.6

The potential for sabotaging undersea cables during times of conflict, as part of grey zone or hybrid warfare operations or by transnational terrorism and organised crime exists, but such incidents have not been confirmed yet.

Information was collected through extensive desk research and review of key strategies, policy documents, incident reports and studies published on the issue, and thematic interviews and written inputs from practitioners and advisers from a range of backgrounds.

40 % of cable disruptions arise from bottom-tending commercial fishing equipment and related dredging. Another 15 % of damage is caused by anchoring incidents, such as improperly stored anchors, anchoring outside approved areas, sea conditions affecting anchor positioning, and the emergency dropping of an anchor.

hese include the Danish Subsea Cable Protection Committee, the European Fishery Control Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European Subsea Cable Association, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, and cybersecurity and maritime security experts

en cable systems

Equiano, 2 Africa, PEACE, Africa 1

“The risk is real,” DeBacker said. “It has materialized in the past, and what we're trying to do is prevent it from materializing in the future.”

That cable, known as the Southeast Asia-Japan 2 cable, was planned to run from Singapore through Southeast Asia and touch down in Hong Kong and mainland China before going on to South Korea and Japan. China has delayed giving a license for the cable to pass through the South China Sea, citing concerns about the potential for the cable manufacturer – Japan’s NEC – to insert spy equipment on the line, the consultants said.

HMN Tech supplied 18% of the subsea cables to have come online in the last four years, but the Chinese firm is only due to build 7% of cables currently under development worldwide, according to TeleGeography. These figures are based on the total length of cable laid, not the number of projects.

Similarly, the Bay to Bay Express Cable System, developed by Amazon, Meta and China Mobile, will not run as planned from Singapore to Hong Kong to California. As part of a deal struck between Amazon, Meta and Team Telecom, China Mobile left the consortium and the cable was rebranded as CAP-1, with a new route from Grover Beach, California, to the Philippines, three people involved said.

The first, a project owned by Google and Meta known as the Pacific Light Cable Network, will now only transmit data from the United States to Taiwan and the Philippines, after Team Telecom recommended that the FCC reject the Hong Kong leg. The section of the cable going to Hong Kong, spanning hundreds of miles, is currently lying abandoned on the ocean floor, two people involved in the deal said.

Washington’s decision to nix any Hong Kong terminus for the four planned subsea cable deals upended the plans of Google, Meta and Amazon.

To that end, the team makes cable licensing recommendations to the U.S. telecom regulator, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Since 2020, the team has been instrumental in the cancellation of four cables whose backers had wanted to link the United States with Hong Kong, Devin DeBacker, a DOJ official and senior member of Team Telecom, told Reuters in an interview.

The U.S.-China backroom brawling over undersea cables is threatening to overwhelm the subsea cable industry, which has always relied on careful diplomatic collaboration to survive, said Paul McCann, a Sydney-based subsea cable consultant.

Two new investors – Telekom Malaysia Berhad and PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia International (Telin) – joined the deal, and some of the original members raised their stakes to make up the shortfall, the people said.

HMN Tech could be subject to U.S. sanctions in the near future. That in turn would make it difficult for the telecoms to sell bandwidth because their biggest likely customers – U.S. tech firms – wouldn’t be allowed to use the cable.

HMN Tech expanded its ambitions with the PEACE cable, which came online last year and connects Asia, Africa and Europe. The firm was poised to make another great leap with the Singapore-to-France project before SubCom snatched it away.

Fast-forward 15 years and the firm, now known as HMN Tech, has become the world’s fastest-growing manufacturer and layer of subsea cables, according to TeleGeography data.

America’s SubCom, Japan’s NEC Corporation and France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks, Inc.

France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks is building the cable

Over the last year, the Biden administration has pushed through a landmark bill to provide $52.7 billion in subsidies for U.S. semiconductor production and research. The Commerce Department in December added dozens of Chinese firms producing technology such as drones and artificial intelligence chips to its so-called Entity List, which severely restricts their access to U.S. technology.

Though the cable won’t come ashore in Chinese territory, the U.S. government believed HMN Tech could insert remote surveillance equipment inside the cable, the official said without providing evidence.

The U.S. cable effort has been anchored by a three-year-old interagency task force informally known as Team Telecom.

Undersea cables are central to U.S.-China technology competition.

It’s one of at least six private undersea cable deals in the Asia-Pacific region over the past four years where the U.S. government either intervened to keep HMN Tech from winning that business, or forced the rerouting or abandonment of cables that would have directly linked U.S. and Chinese territories.

HMN Tech, whose predecessor company was majority-owned by Chinese telecom giant Huawei Technologies Co Ltd,  was selected in early 2020 to manufacture and lay the cable, the people said, due in part to hefty subsidies from Beijing that lowered the cost. HMN Tech’s bid of $500 million was roughly a third cheaper than the initial proposal submitted to the cable consortium by New Jersey-based SubCom, the people said.

“It seems we are headed down a road where there will be a U.S.-led internet and a Chinese-led internet ecosystem,” Heath told Reuters. “The more the U.S. and Chinese disengage from each other in the information technology domain, the more difficult it becomes to carry out global commerce and basic functions.”

The construction of parallel U.S.- and Chinese-backed cables between Asia and Europe is unprecedented,

“It’s like each side is arming itself with bandwidth,” one telecom executive working on the deal said.

it would create a super-fast new connection between Hong Kong, China and much of the rest of the world, something Washington wants to avoid. Secondly, it gives China’s state-backed telecom carriers greater reach and protection in the event they are excluded from U.S.-backed cables in the future.

at least three years to move from conception to delivery.

Countries should prioritize security and privacy by “fully excluding untrustworthy vendors” from wireless networks, terrestrial and undersea cables, satellites, cloud services and data centers, the spokesperson said, without mentioning HMN Tech or China.

undermined the project's viability by making it impossible for owners of an HMN-built cable to sell bandwidth to U.S. tech firms, usually their biggest customers.

slapped sanctions on HMN Tech in December 2021

initially picked HMN Tech to build that cable. But a successful U.S. government pressure campaign flipped the contract to SubCom last year, Reuters reported in March.

The China-led EMA project is intended to directly rival another cable currently being constructed by U.S. firm SubCom LLC, called SeaMeWe-6 (Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe-6), which will also connect Singapore to France, via Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and half a dozen other countries along the route.

China’s HMN Technologies Co Ltd

$500 million

EMA (Europe-Middle East-Asia)

China Telecommunications Corporation (China Telecom), China Mobile Limited and China United Network Communications Group Co Ltd(China Unicom)

The first is what sort of targets are chosen

A third test is how well cyber forces protect their arsenals.

Officials and experts have spent years debating how international law, including the laws of armed conflict, apply to cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual, associated with nato, is one such guide.

Another is how well attacks are calibrated. Are they precise in their effects and mindful of escalation?

The ncf’s new paper is important because it spells out a realistic and circumscribed view of cyber power. It says that its main purpose is not so much kinetic—a digital substitute for air strikes—as cognitive.

In a speech on March 30th, she said Europe wanted to “de-risk” rather than “decouple” its relations with China.

“a just peace that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

(e.g., Google’s AlphaGo, OpenAI’s GPT-3, Tesla’s AutoPilot)

This language on the “technical infrastructure essential to the general availability or integrity of the Internet” stems from proposals by the Netherlands relevant to the public core of the Internet, which in turns draws from the work of Dutch scholar Dennis Broeders on the topic, later taken up by the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace in its proposal for a norm to protect the public core of the Internet. For the relevant United Nations reports, see footnote 122 above. For the Broeders publication, see Dennis Broeders (2016), The Public Core of the Internet: An International Agenda for Internet Governance, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/32439/610631.pdf. For the report of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace and its advocacy for a norm of non-interference with the ‘public core of the Internet’, defined as including “such critical elements of the infrastructure of the Internet as packet routing and forwarding, naming and numbering systems, the cryptographic mechanisms of security and identity, transmission media [including terrestrial and undersea cables and the landing stations, data centres, and other physical facilities which support them], software, and data centers” (pp. 30–31), see Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (2019), “Advancing Cyberstability: Final Report”, https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/GCSC-Final-Report-November-2019.pdf

According to Subcom, an undersea cable repair can cost in excess of US$ 1 million and typically takes 2 weeks to return the cable to service—or more, depending on permitting requirements, weather, and other factors.

Until just over a decade ago, intensity modulated direct detection was the optical transmission technology most commonly used in subsea cables. This method transmits information over subsea and terrestrial optical fibres by using laser pulses to encode digital data. Since then, further advances in coherent optical transmission have allowed single-channel data rates to increase more than a hundred fold.18 In addition, wavelength division multiplexing has increased the number of channels carried per fibre.19 Cable capacities vary depending on the cable system, but advances such as spatial division multiplexing will allow newer systems to carry as much as 500 terabytes per second.20 In systems longer than a few hundred kilometres, optical amplifiers (housed in watertight containers known as repeaters) boost the signals along the length of the cable roughly every 100 km.

n shallow water (usually defined as less than 1000 m), the cable may also be buried under the seabed to provide further protection from, for instance, ships’ anchors and fishing operations.

eleGeography’s 2022 Submarine Cable Map depicting 486 cable systems and 1,306 landings currently active of under construction; seehttps://submarine-cable-map-2022.telegeography.com/.

DataCenterDynamics (2022), ‘World’s Longest Subsea Cable Lands in Djibouti, East Africa’, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/worlds-longest-subsea-cable-lands-in-djibouti-east-africa; Reuters (2022), “MTN Lands Subsea Cable in South Africa to Boost Africa’s Connectivity”, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mtn-lands-subsea-cable-south-africa-boost-africas-connectivity-2022-12-13/.

In 2022, following significant consultations, the International Cable Protection Committee published its Government Best Practices for Protecting and Promoting Resilience of Submarine Telecommunications Cables to “assist governments in developing laws, policies, and practices to foster the development and protection of submarine telecommunications cables, the infrastructure of the Internet”; see https://www.iscpc.org/publications/icpc-best-practices/.

a more in-depth conversation on subsea communications cables, on the adequateness of the existing cable governance regime, and what might be done to strengthen it. Such conversations are already commencing at regional and national levels

science and technology, engineering, maritime security, public international law, environmental protection, governance and security studies, history, and archaeology to name but a few

Egypt's submarine cable stranglehold

permissionless organization

That means silos and layers can give way to small teams, equipped with all the competencies needed to see a project through from beginning to end.

to adopt structures that are flatter and more reconfigurable than those they’ve traditionally used.

are pushing decision-making ability to the edges of the organization, allowing businesses to adopt structures that are flatter and more reconfigurable than those they have traditionally used.

Australia’s law, passed in 2021, prodded tech firms to make payments to Australian media reportedly worth about A$200m ($135m) in the scheme’s first year.

News organisations, which in the past two decades have seen most of their advertising revenue disappear online, accuse search engines and social networks of profiting from content that is not theirs.

“It’s free and always will be,”

multimodal learning i

we want people to ask better questions. We want students to really to dive into their inquiries. We want teachers to deepen their inquiries. And I think only good things can come from people asking better questions, more questions. And I think that's what, both from an ethical perspective in terms of who has access,

about media literacy and critical literacy that scholars and teachers have been doing for a long time.