.S. adoption of a GDPR-like law is “the first practical step the [United States] should take.

Align data privacy laws

fosters a multipolar community of independent countries, settling disputes through negotiation, transparency, and the rule of law

The Biden Administration is committed to promoting an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet; protecting human rights online and offline; and supporting a vibrant, global digital economy. Certain countries, including the People’s Republic of China, do not share these values and seek to leverage digital technologies and Americans’ data in ways that present unacceptable national security risks while advancing authoritarian controls and interests.

can democratic governments, along with their companies and citizens, build the next generation’s digital operating system to protect global norms, prosperity, and security—even as the CCP seeks to undermine them?

employing regulatory tools like export controls, investment security mechanisms, and restrictions on data and capital flows,

there are existing norms, standards, and infrastructure that can serve as cornerstones.

imagining that convergence and market access are just over the horizon are over.

must abandon the fantasy that the CCP can be persuaded in any meaningful way to drop its challenge to the liberal international order and the digital infrastructure beneath it.

to accept that Beijing’s alternative system and its challenge to the global architecture are a present reality, not a future condition.

he world safe for authoritarianism by legitimizing its governance model,

by interrupting the spread of “Western constitutional democracy,” which in the party’s view has a number of distinct characteristics, including “the separation of powers, the multi-party system, general elections, independent judiciaries, [and] nationalized armies.”

o develop, export, and set the rules of—while maintaining control over—both the physical and digital networks of the fourth industrial revolution.

re-engineer the operating system of the international order into something that advantages Beijing’s regime, advances an illiberal worldview, and provides the party greater control of resources, industry, and information.

the pernicious effects of liberal ideology embedded in the international system.

The incumbent liberal international system was established following World War II. It is based on the Bretton Woods agreements, which promoted efficient foreign commerce, and global norms articulated in the United Nations Charter that center on individual rights, limited government, self-determination, multilateral institutions to negotiate disputes between states, and collective security to deter conflict.

his happens at a time of global reshuffling, catalyzed by the emergence of data as a factor of production, that raises the stakes and severity of the CCP’s challenge.

becoming the “operating system” for a new, illiberal international orde

over both the physical and digital networks of the fourth industrial revolution.

building digital platforms and infrastructure that risk becoming the “operating system” for a new, illiberal international order

new security threats for the United States arising from reduced global dependence on GPS

The dual-use nature of information technology systems means that they can serve commercial ends while propping up a national security system. And throughout, they collect and transfer data—the new, determinative factor of production.

ven five years prior to the completion of BeiDou-3, the system had already started generating $31.5 billion in annual revenue for online clients, including Chinese defense industry conglomerates like CASIC and China North Industries Group Corporation, an arms manufacturer.

“China-Africa Digital Innovation Partnership Program...[to] strengthen digital infrastructure, develop a digital economy, carry out digital education, enhance digital inclusion, co-create digital security, and build a cooperative platform [between China and the nations of Africa].”6

China also helped develop and launch Ethiopia’s first two satellites and provided meteorological satellite data–receiving equipment to Mozambique.

he first “overseas BeiDou [applications research] center” being located in Tunisia. Chinese experts have led BeiDou training sessions in Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco.63

“BeiDou has provided services and related products to more than 100 million users in countries and regions along the Belt and Road and exported [those services and products] to more than 120 countries and regions.”6

The expansion of BeiDou services into countries that have signed on to BRI, and the displacement of GPS in those countries as a result, has been described as a key opportunity for the initiative.

BeiDou is a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Xi Jinping himself has linked China’s rise as a space power to his overarching goal of bringing about “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” claiming that “the aerospace dream is an important component of [China’s] dream of [becoming] a powerful country.”58

In March 2021 the Iranian government signed a 25-year agreement with China granting Iran’s armed forces access to the BeiDou network

Indian media reported that Pakistani authorities intended to adopt BeiDou for both civilian and military purposes, with the country “completely [switching] to the BeiDou navigation system for all its critical military platforms.

he Russian legislature’s passage in July 2019 of a law enshrining cooperation between Russia’s GLONASS system and BeiDou caused concern among some U.S. analysts, given the country’s history of jamming and spoofing GPS signals over large areas

to supplant GPS as the number-one navigation system on (and above) the planet.

the BeiDou-3 constellation

he United States’ use of GPS-guided precision munitions during the 1991 Gulf War and the July 1993 Yinhe incident, during which a Chinese freighter lost its ability to navigate after the United States temporarily suspended GPS coverage over the Indian Ocean.

Chinese state media has identified its navigation services as central to “national defense mobilization,” while also noting applications in consumer smartphones, public transportation, and agricultural monitoring

8 satellites in geostationary orbit, 27 in medium Earth orbit, and 10 in inclined geosynchronous orbit. Another 5 BeiDou-3 experimental satellites—3 in medium Earth orbit and 2 in inclined geosynchronous orbit—also exist within the constellation, albeit on a different signal system

his phase builds on the 15 existing satellites of the BeiDou-2 constellation, which provides navigation services to the Asia-Pacific.

consists of 30 satellites launched between November 5, 2017, and June 23, 2020

The successful launch of the final satellite in the third phase of the BeiDou constellation (hence BeiDou-3) on June 23, 2020, made China the third individual nation (after the United States and Russia) to put a complete satellite navigation system with global reach into orbit.

“The BeiDou-3 Navigation Satellite System is formally commissioned!”

Traditional modes and mechanisms of international competition, such as military deployments and actions in institutions of multilateral governance, are insufficient to address Beijing’s challenge.

the Military-Civil Fusion strategy

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also consolidated control over the management decisions of both state-owned and ostensibly private corporations like Alibaba.

Economic statecraft is traditionally defined in the West as a suite of policy tools, including sanctions, export restrictions, and investment screening.

hey wield significant influence over society and political institutions; retain massive amounts of data globally, including on people; and are the primary incubators of cutting-edge innovations that will define the next era of economic

Corporations are the defining instruments of 21st-century strategic competition.

China’s digital strategy creates the prospect of a Chinese-led digital bloc that operates telecommunications, financial payments, e-commerce, logistics, internet, and satellite navigation separate from the rest of the world.

China’s industrial policy could subvert the incentive structures that underpin innovation—the engine of economic and military power—including the competitive and financial returns inherent in ingenuity and the laws that protect global markets.

to entice foreign companies to establish R&D facilities in China.3

According to Tai Ming Cheung, this policy encourages the “going out” of Chinese firms to gain access to foreign R&D and technology

In October 2021, Tokyo appointed a new minister of economic security to—among other things—counter economic espionage.35

In 2020 the European Commission proposed hiring “civilian spy catchers” to protect research and innovation developed within research universities from being

he cost of PRC IP theft for the U.S. economy at $400–$600 billion a year.

China has developed a systematic approach to identifying, targeting, and acquiring IP and talent from around the world. IP theft erodes the long-term competitiveness of global companies, especially as stolen IP is absorbed and repurposed by Chinese firms to compete in global markets.

Acquisition of foreign IP through both licit and illicit means and the subversion of strategic industries through overcapitalization

across 1,741 guidance funds, including at least $60 billion specifically allocated to the integrated circuity industry via the National IC Industry Investment Fund (Big Fund).

the Big Fund aims to subvert the global semiconductor industry by creating overcapacity, just as China did in the solar and LED industries.

China has invested over $100 billion into the semiconductor industry, while also heavily subsidizing the purchase of Chinese chips domestically and targeting foreign semiconductor firms to acquire IP.

technological capacity requires manufacturing capacity.

“China’s Head Start: CCP Industrial Policy for Global Automotive Ascendance,” Horizon Advisory, June 18, 2021, available at https://issuu.com/horizonadvisory/docs/horizon_advisory_-_china_s_head_star

hina dominates global production of the basket of minerals necessary for emerging technologies, including cobalt, lithium, and nickel

China’s primary Internet of Things module manufacturer, Quectel, controls more than a third of the global market,26

rare earths

In 2018 the U.S. Department of Defense concluded that China poses a “significant and growing risk to the supply of materials deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security.”

China continues to control global rare earth production,

China restricted rare earth exports to Japan in retaliation for disputes over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.

by controlling value chains for emerging industries, which grants coercive leverage.

China’s propaganda and dissemination of disinformation could also help stir up popular unrest or shape voter preferences, skewing the incentives and priorities of democratic governments.

TikTok is owned and controlled by ByteDance, a Chinese company, and in August 2021 the Chinese government, through a state-owned entity, claimed a board seat and stake in ByteDance.20 ByteDance—and through it the Chinese government—are reportedly able to access the information of U.S.-based TikTok users.

hina’s global digital architecture allows it to shape the digital environment—not only to obstruct competitors’ activities

China-Africa Partnership Plan on Digital Innovation to solidify China’s position on the continent,

s of 2021, Huawei alone had built 50% of the African continent’s 3G networks and 70% of its 4G networks.14

Some date Huawei’s first forays into African countries back to 1996.1

hat Chinese hackers were stealing massive amounts of camera footage from the African Union headquarters.

n March 2018, French newspaper Le Monderevealed that between 2012 and 2017 confidential data on an African Union ICT system provided by Huawei had been routed to a server in Shanghai each evening.

ilk Road Information Port Co.,

The company, with support from Guangxi and central government agencies, is driving China-ASEAN network integration and information exchange to promote the Digital Silk Road.

China-ASEAN Information Harbor Company (China Eastcom), a state-controlled information technology company

“new internet exchange” hub in Nanning by China’s three state-owned telecom operators,

The China-ASEAN Information Harbor Digital Economy Alliance represents one such initiative led by the PRC government to form a digital infrastructure ecosystem interweaving China with Southeast Asian nations that could in time serve as a bulwark hindering U.S. commercial pursuits and establishing new standards and norms for digital operators in the region.

the strategic underpinnings of the “going out” of Chinese ICT companies

to undermine the incentives and legal structures that drive Western innovation, chiefly the concept and protection of intellectual property (IP) rights,

to dominate critical nodes in strategic, digital-relevant industry chains and infrastructure and convert them into coercive leverage

to shape the international information environment, including through dissemination of propaganda and disinformation

The use of global digital systems, including commercial platforms, to acquire superior information

A state-driven agenda that forces companies to pursue government interests,

They demand that the United States and other liberal democracies acquire a broader perspective of security and competition, one that accounts for not only traditional military and intelligence concerns and actors but also economic and political ones.

international information environment

China aims to be the first country to merge the components of the digital triad to not only drive economic development and commercial value but also enhance the competitiveness of its diplomatic, military, and intelligence operations

by a mutually reinforcing and interactive “digital triad” of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, big data, and artificial intelligence.

y a mutually reinforcing and interactive “digital triad” of information and communications technology infrastructure, big data, and artificial intelligence.

Reaching an agreement between the United States and EU on the issue of privacy is central to pressuring China to sign onto ambitious data flow provisions that would require it to remove the majority of its localization policies.

Europe wants a broad self-judging exception for privacy, while China wants the same for national security.

binding set of rules to support data flows and prohibit data localization, with narrow, targeted exceptions for privacy and national security.

The United States also needs to devote more staff to actively engage in UN, ITU, and WTO discussions on digital and cyber issues.

The United States and others need to do more to ensure that these issues are addressed in the proper forum and receive greater support, such as digital development assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Huawei’s New IP proposal initially received reasonable support among African countries before they understood its full implications.

the United States needs to broaden its cyber diplomacy engagement and educational outreach

he challenge for the United States and others is to develop and deploy a more coordinated and effective approach to digital policies, such as data privacy, cybersecurity, content moderation, government access to data, and other digital issues, to compete with China’s policies.

The United States and others need to move on from a largely ad hoc response to a detailed and coordinated all-points strategy that responds to China at every forum and level (i.e., country, regional, and multilateral).

a whole-of-government global digital strategy to counter China’s growing and multifaceted efforts to advocate for a top-down, state-controlled internet.

It is possible that China will sign on to ambitious provisions related to data and digital trade if it can get broad self-judging exceptions for national security and other interests that allow it to essentially circumvent the intended impact of these new rules.

whether the final agreement includes tiered commitments, especially for developing countries.

China’s submission shows it wants a broad, self-judging exception for cyber and national security

he EU wants a self-judging exception, but to protect privacy, allowing it to justify data localization in the name of privac

The first centers on how parties negotiate exceptions to rules that protect data flows and prohibit data localization.

that an agreement will have no credibility without data-related provisions.

opposing talks on data and digital trade (it wanted talks to focus on goods-based e-commerce).

China initially opposed the 2017 launch of the WTO’s Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce that was supported by the United States and dozens of other countries.

India also pushed for the self-judging national security exception before ultimately deciding it did not want to join the partnership.

RCEP provisions on data flows are largely symbolic because they are not subject to dispute settlement, thus making them unenforceable, and are weaker than provisions in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, to which China is a party.35

self-judging exceptions for privacy and national security that allow it to keep its myriad data localization and data restrictions in place.

DEPA is not just a trade agreement but a forum for cooperation on digital and data-related issues such as AI, data privacy, digital identities, e-invoicing, fintech and e-payments, and open government data

involves Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore

it applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)

China has refused to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules system, which it sees as a U.S. plot to steal its data.3

China has refused to negotiate trade rules around data flows, data governance, and digital trade, citing sovereignty.

China will likely push for a vaguely defined, self-judging “national security” exception in any digital trade agreement so that it can keep its array of localization measures in place.

libaba is the world’s fourth-biggest cloud-computing service.32 Tencent Cloud remains dependent on its protected home market, which alone gives it a larger worldwide market share than IBM or Oracle

libaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud are major players globally but still lag behind AWS, Microsoft, and Google in size, capability, and coverage.

a sales strategy of giving local governments what they want, in terms of local storage and control, can be effective.

U.S. firms have stated that they are not generally losing contracts to Chinese firms on price or services, but Alibaba’s and Tencent’s advocacy on data localization and seamless government access to data is proving successful in some markets (especially for government-contracted data and services).

U.S. cloud service providers and other tech firms generally oppose data localization and expansive government requests for data as they add unnecessary costs and complexities to global IT systems and operations.

he general manager of Alibaba Cloud India said the company, which has set up data centers in India, sees a big opportunity in the Indian government’s push toward data localization.

The initial debate has often revolved around the major data governance models—U.S.-style data-driven innovation and digital free trade, EU-type precautionary principle and restrictive regulations, and China-like digital control and protectionism—with many being drawn to the Chinese model.

Senegal decided to replicate China’s approach of requiring that all data from state-owned enterprises and the government be stored locally.

Huawei built much of Tanzania’s ICT infrastructure as well as its national data center.

Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, have considered or enacted data localization policies and embraced notions of cyber sovereignty at the same time that Huawei and other Chinese firms were building data centers and expanding cloud services.

China offers preferential financing for its firms to construct submarine cables and 5G and other telecommunication networks.2

ndonesia started actively supporting the concept of data security in G-20 documents, including in the 2021 G-20 statement from Rome (though the final statement did not include a reference).

While China and Russia signed onto the Osaka Track framework (inspired by Japan’s proposal for “data free flow with trust”) to promote the drafting of international rules on the free movement of data, this does not mean they support its aims or how Japan and the United States interpret the framework.

but offer positive alternatives.

China’s approach of taking issues that are normally discussed at the WTO and technical, multistakeholder forums like the Internet Engineering Task Force and putting them on the ITU agenda

Given the criticism and opposition to the proposal, China broke it into pieces to advocate in various ITU committees and study groups, making it harder for opposed countries to track and respond to each separate element

So China convinced Malaysia to lead the effort.

China wants to expand the scope of the ITU to include digital trade and the broader digital economy even though the union’s jurisdiction does not include internet architecture.

ven if a major proposal is defeated, China can break it into many pieces and convince representatives to embed them in other committees and forums.

this public-private “death by a thousand cuts”

In recent years, many Chinese companies have become sector members in ITU committees and study groups for technical standards, especially as they relate to smart cities and surveillance-related technologies.

China and Russia prefer to use this committee because its outcomes tend to be based on explicit references to nonintervention, central to cyber sovereignty

comprehensive agenda—or, as one official described it, “issue creep”—on cybercrime and cybersecurity to cover broader data and internet governance issues, even though these issues are not within the usual scope of the United Nations.

Though Beijing does not generally like being isolated on an issue (especially without Moscow), it is getting more comfortable spearheading arguments on cyber issues.

“flood the zone”

he large membership in these organizations allows China to use its full toolbox of incentives to get other countries to support its proposals and positions.

Government-based institutions also make it easier for China to marginalize public- and private-sector advocacy groups that oppose its policies and often prefer the alternative multistakeholder model of internet governance.

China seeks to restrict and control foreign companies operating within its borders, while ensuring that Chinese companies expanding abroad do not face equivalent restriction or overseas control.

contradictory.

This highlights China’s efforts to shape the narrative around data governance and security to achieve multiple competing outcomes regarding digital trade, data-driven innovation, data flows, and a state-centered and -controlled internet.

China characterizes GIDS as an initiative to safeguard global data and supply chain security, promote development of the digital economy, and provide a basis for international rulemaking for data.1

Its global data advocacy took an evolutionary step forward with the 2020 launch of GIDS.

its broad definition of national security is such that most data is dual-use or, put otherwise, falls into both categories.

the legal fiction of “important data” is a broad category in the hierarchical data classification framework in the Cybersecurity Law.

Data localization is both explicit (codified in Chinese laws and regulations) and de facto

do not create meaningful constraints on the state in relation to access, use, or enforcement practices.

he Cybersecurity Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Data Security Law

These include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s privacy principles, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s Cross-Border Privacy Regime, the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (“Convention 108”), and various WTO agreements.

he data is governed by a disparate group of multistakeholder forums, domestic laws, and a few international agreements and sets of principles.

There is no single international forum that manages global data governance.

Australia, European Union countries, Japan, Singapore, the United States, and others are advocating for their preferred approaches to data privacy, cybersecurity, digital trade, and other data-related issues.

obvious implications for human rights like freedom of speech and association, as well as the spread of misinformation globally.

China is also working to normalize data localization in the global digital economy,

China’s efforts to set up stringent oversight mechanisms to review requests by firms to transfer data reinforce its preference for local data storage

“community of common destiny in cyberspace,”

it has designated data as the fifth factor of production—after land, labor, capital, and technology.1

China clearly recognizes data’s critical role in economic development and national security.

Beijing has clearly and forcibly advocated for “cyber sovereignty” and a state-centric approach to international data governance, such as via its Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS)

Economically, a unified Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean front in favor of Linux would present a steep challenge for Microsoft, as “CJK’s global ambition for the world’s open source software market may threaten U.S. technological leadership and could damage U.S.-based companies.”9

his and the forum’s larger open-source mission are framed in opposition to Microsoft—and as part of the Chinese government’s effort to unseat that legacy company’s market, standards, and dominance.

the OSS Forum has focused on cooperation in developing Linux standards.

the OSS Forum engages with international standards bodies, including ISO/IEC JTC 1 and the Free Standards Group.

o “promot[ing] the development of the open source software industry in the three countries and enhancing the status and influence of Northeast Asia in the international open source community and industry.”

However, where the NEAS Forum targets ISO and IEC standards, the CJK-ITSM is more focused on ITU.

the three countries had committed to exploring “solutions to support each other in ISO activities,” as well as the stationing of ISO and IEC management personnel.

the NEAS Forum and its projects are designed to influence international standards and standards organizations, especially ISO and IEC.

CJK-SITE focuses on the standardization activities of ISO/IEC JTC 1, as well as other IEC technical committees covering information technologies and electronics.

hese mechanisms include the Northeast Asia Standards Cooperation Forum (NEAS Forum) and the China-Japan-Korea IT Standards Meeting (CJK-ITSM), as well as more targeted mechanisms like the Northeast Asia Open Source Software Promotion Forum (OSS Forum).

At the 2011 meeting, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) proposed coordination in IPv6 standardization; at the 2018 event, the three sides agreed to coordinate in developing 5G systems.

“while they compete against each other in the arena of international standardization, they need each other to support the development of each other’s standards and to strengthen them in markets, both domestic and international.”7

China also pursues bilateral, multilateral, and regional engagement to shape the direction of other countries’ standards development, lock in recognition of Chinese standards in foreign markets, and drum up support in international standards bodies.

The United States and its allies and partners should establish and fund a new organization composed of government and industry representatives that is dedicated to developing and proposing new standards recommendations in strategic areas.

They should terminate bilateral standards cooperation with the Chinese government and government-controlled entities.

China benefits from the reality that it competes for international standards while other national governments cooperate

Greater transparency

A tit-for-tat competition is unlikely to succeed; instead, an effective response to China’s standards strategy will demand coordination among private- and public-sector actors across not only

China’s size, centralization, and industrial capacity grant it structural advantages in influencing international standards:

It treats technical standards as tools, and sources, of national power, while other countries have historically left the standards contest to commercial players.

The digital revolution has raised the strategic value of standards, and Beijing is competing to set them.

Should those efforts be scaled and combined with standard setting in digital logistics, Alibaba could lock in vertically integrated control over information flows for future trade and the physical goods and systems that will depend on them

For example, Alibaba, the Chinese Ministry of Transport, and the International Port Community Systems Association—an association of sea and air port authorities, port community system operators for both sea and air, and single-window operators—have jointly launched a task force on logistics visibility.6

Once Chinese infrastructure is laid and Chinese equipment is loaded on it, it is only a matter of time before Chinese standards will be used

While Brazil has condemned the invasion at the United Nations, it also this week supported Putin’s presence at the G20 summit in November in Bali amid pressure by the United States and its allies to bar the Russian leader from attending.

“For us, the fertilizer issue is sacred,” he said days after the Russian invasion began on February 24. “We are not going to take sides, we are going to continue with neutrality and help in whatever way possible in search of a solution.”

What is most relevant in this trade between Brazil and Russia is the purchases that Brazil makes of Russian fertilizers.”

“In Indonesian political culture ‘strongmen’ are characteristically autocratic, demagogic and dismissive of democratic processes,” said Wilson. “Many see this in Putin, but not in a figure such as Zelenskyy who is often characterised in commentary as a ‘puppet’ of external forces, despite his emergence as a genuine leader in a time of crisis.”

Writing in a blog for the University of Melbourne, Dharmaputra notes Russia has established a science and culture centre in Jakarta, set up an Indonesian language version of the Russia Beyond the Headlines website and provided scholarships for Indonesian students as well as funding for centres of Russian Studies at Indonesian universities.

“This has had an impact on them questioning the credibility of news sources, in the sense of the US mass media. Many state that they can’t just accept news from the US without reading the other side – but the root of this is their distrust of the US in general,”

“Indonesia needs Russia as an alternative weapon supplier, so it won’t be completely reliant on the US.”

The spirit of NAM continues to inform Indonesian foreign policy, which maintains what it calls a “bebas-aktif” approach to international affairs – an “independent” stance and an “active” role in global governance.