hat Chinese hackers were stealing massive amounts of camera footage from the African Union headquarters.

n March 2018, French newspaper Le Monderevealed that between 2012 and 2017 confidential data on an African Union ICT system provided by Huawei had been routed to a server in Shanghai each evening.

ilk Road Information Port Co.,

The company, with support from Guangxi and central government agencies, is driving China-ASEAN network integration and information exchange to promote the Digital Silk Road.

China-ASEAN Information Harbor Company (China Eastcom), a state-controlled information technology company

“new internet exchange” hub in Nanning by China’s three state-owned telecom operators,

The China-ASEAN Information Harbor Digital Economy Alliance represents one such initiative led by the PRC government to form a digital infrastructure ecosystem interweaving China with Southeast Asian nations that could in time serve as a bulwark hindering U.S. commercial pursuits and establishing new standards and norms for digital operators in the region.

the strategic underpinnings of the “going out” of Chinese ICT companies

to undermine the incentives and legal structures that drive Western innovation, chiefly the concept and protection of intellectual property (IP) rights,

to dominate critical nodes in strategic, digital-relevant industry chains and infrastructure and convert them into coercive leverage

to shape the international information environment, including through dissemination of propaganda and disinformation

The use of global digital systems, including commercial platforms, to acquire superior information

A state-driven agenda that forces companies to pursue government interests,

They demand that the United States and other liberal democracies acquire a broader perspective of security and competition, one that accounts for not only traditional military and intelligence concerns and actors but also economic and political ones.

international information environment

China aims to be the first country to merge the components of the digital triad to not only drive economic development and commercial value but also enhance the competitiveness of its diplomatic, military, and intelligence operations

by a mutually reinforcing and interactive “digital triad” of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, big data, and artificial intelligence.

y a mutually reinforcing and interactive “digital triad” of information and communications technology infrastructure, big data, and artificial intelligence.

Reaching an agreement between the United States and EU on the issue of privacy is central to pressuring China to sign onto ambitious data flow provisions that would require it to remove the majority of its localization policies.

Europe wants a broad self-judging exception for privacy, while China wants the same for national security.

binding set of rules to support data flows and prohibit data localization, with narrow, targeted exceptions for privacy and national security.

The United States also needs to devote more staff to actively engage in UN, ITU, and WTO discussions on digital and cyber issues.

The United States and others need to do more to ensure that these issues are addressed in the proper forum and receive greater support, such as digital development assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Huawei’s New IP proposal initially received reasonable support among African countries before they understood its full implications.

the United States needs to broaden its cyber diplomacy engagement and educational outreach

he challenge for the United States and others is to develop and deploy a more coordinated and effective approach to digital policies, such as data privacy, cybersecurity, content moderation, government access to data, and other digital issues, to compete with China’s policies.

The United States and others need to move on from a largely ad hoc response to a detailed and coordinated all-points strategy that responds to China at every forum and level (i.e., country, regional, and multilateral).

a whole-of-government global digital strategy to counter China’s growing and multifaceted efforts to advocate for a top-down, state-controlled internet.

It is possible that China will sign on to ambitious provisions related to data and digital trade if it can get broad self-judging exceptions for national security and other interests that allow it to essentially circumvent the intended impact of these new rules.

whether the final agreement includes tiered commitments, especially for developing countries.

China’s submission shows it wants a broad, self-judging exception for cyber and national security

he EU wants a self-judging exception, but to protect privacy, allowing it to justify data localization in the name of privac

The first centers on how parties negotiate exceptions to rules that protect data flows and prohibit data localization.

that an agreement will have no credibility without data-related provisions.

opposing talks on data and digital trade (it wanted talks to focus on goods-based e-commerce).

China initially opposed the 2017 launch of the WTO’s Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce that was supported by the United States and dozens of other countries.

India also pushed for the self-judging national security exception before ultimately deciding it did not want to join the partnership.

RCEP provisions on data flows are largely symbolic because they are not subject to dispute settlement, thus making them unenforceable, and are weaker than provisions in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, to which China is a party.35

self-judging exceptions for privacy and national security that allow it to keep its myriad data localization and data restrictions in place.

DEPA is not just a trade agreement but a forum for cooperation on digital and data-related issues such as AI, data privacy, digital identities, e-invoicing, fintech and e-payments, and open government data

involves Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore

it applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)

China has refused to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules system, which it sees as a U.S. plot to steal its data.3

China has refused to negotiate trade rules around data flows, data governance, and digital trade, citing sovereignty.

China will likely push for a vaguely defined, self-judging “national security” exception in any digital trade agreement so that it can keep its array of localization measures in place.

libaba is the world’s fourth-biggest cloud-computing service.32 Tencent Cloud remains dependent on its protected home market, which alone gives it a larger worldwide market share than IBM or Oracle

libaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud are major players globally but still lag behind AWS, Microsoft, and Google in size, capability, and coverage.

a sales strategy of giving local governments what they want, in terms of local storage and control, can be effective.

U.S. firms have stated that they are not generally losing contracts to Chinese firms on price or services, but Alibaba’s and Tencent’s advocacy on data localization and seamless government access to data is proving successful in some markets (especially for government-contracted data and services).

U.S. cloud service providers and other tech firms generally oppose data localization and expansive government requests for data as they add unnecessary costs and complexities to global IT systems and operations.

he general manager of Alibaba Cloud India said the company, which has set up data centers in India, sees a big opportunity in the Indian government’s push toward data localization.

The initial debate has often revolved around the major data governance models—U.S.-style data-driven innovation and digital free trade, EU-type precautionary principle and restrictive regulations, and China-like digital control and protectionism—with many being drawn to the Chinese model.

Senegal decided to replicate China’s approach of requiring that all data from state-owned enterprises and the government be stored locally.

Huawei built much of Tanzania’s ICT infrastructure as well as its national data center.

Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, have considered or enacted data localization policies and embraced notions of cyber sovereignty at the same time that Huawei and other Chinese firms were building data centers and expanding cloud services.

China offers preferential financing for its firms to construct submarine cables and 5G and other telecommunication networks.2

ndonesia started actively supporting the concept of data security in G-20 documents, including in the 2021 G-20 statement from Rome (though the final statement did not include a reference).

While China and Russia signed onto the Osaka Track framework (inspired by Japan’s proposal for “data free flow with trust”) to promote the drafting of international rules on the free movement of data, this does not mean they support its aims or how Japan and the United States interpret the framework.

but offer positive alternatives.

China’s approach of taking issues that are normally discussed at the WTO and technical, multistakeholder forums like the Internet Engineering Task Force and putting them on the ITU agenda

Given the criticism and opposition to the proposal, China broke it into pieces to advocate in various ITU committees and study groups, making it harder for opposed countries to track and respond to each separate element

So China convinced Malaysia to lead the effort.

China wants to expand the scope of the ITU to include digital trade and the broader digital economy even though the union’s jurisdiction does not include internet architecture.

ven if a major proposal is defeated, China can break it into many pieces and convince representatives to embed them in other committees and forums.

this public-private “death by a thousand cuts”

In recent years, many Chinese companies have become sector members in ITU committees and study groups for technical standards, especially as they relate to smart cities and surveillance-related technologies.

China and Russia prefer to use this committee because its outcomes tend to be based on explicit references to nonintervention, central to cyber sovereignty

comprehensive agenda—or, as one official described it, “issue creep”—on cybercrime and cybersecurity to cover broader data and internet governance issues, even though these issues are not within the usual scope of the United Nations.

Though Beijing does not generally like being isolated on an issue (especially without Moscow), it is getting more comfortable spearheading arguments on cyber issues.

“flood the zone”

he large membership in these organizations allows China to use its full toolbox of incentives to get other countries to support its proposals and positions.

Government-based institutions also make it easier for China to marginalize public- and private-sector advocacy groups that oppose its policies and often prefer the alternative multistakeholder model of internet governance.

China seeks to restrict and control foreign companies operating within its borders, while ensuring that Chinese companies expanding abroad do not face equivalent restriction or overseas control.

contradictory.

This highlights China’s efforts to shape the narrative around data governance and security to achieve multiple competing outcomes regarding digital trade, data-driven innovation, data flows, and a state-centered and -controlled internet.

China characterizes GIDS as an initiative to safeguard global data and supply chain security, promote development of the digital economy, and provide a basis for international rulemaking for data.1

Its global data advocacy took an evolutionary step forward with the 2020 launch of GIDS.

its broad definition of national security is such that most data is dual-use or, put otherwise, falls into both categories.

the legal fiction of “important data” is a broad category in the hierarchical data classification framework in the Cybersecurity Law.

Data localization is both explicit (codified in Chinese laws and regulations) and de facto

do not create meaningful constraints on the state in relation to access, use, or enforcement practices.

he Cybersecurity Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Data Security Law

These include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s privacy principles, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s Cross-Border Privacy Regime, the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (“Convention 108”), and various WTO agreements.

he data is governed by a disparate group of multistakeholder forums, domestic laws, and a few international agreements and sets of principles.

There is no single international forum that manages global data governance.

Australia, European Union countries, Japan, Singapore, the United States, and others are advocating for their preferred approaches to data privacy, cybersecurity, digital trade, and other data-related issues.

obvious implications for human rights like freedom of speech and association, as well as the spread of misinformation globally.

China is also working to normalize data localization in the global digital economy,

China’s efforts to set up stringent oversight mechanisms to review requests by firms to transfer data reinforce its preference for local data storage

“community of common destiny in cyberspace,”

it has designated data as the fifth factor of production—after land, labor, capital, and technology.1

China clearly recognizes data’s critical role in economic development and national security.

Beijing has clearly and forcibly advocated for “cyber sovereignty” and a state-centric approach to international data governance, such as via its Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS)

Economically, a unified Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean front in favor of Linux would present a steep challenge for Microsoft, as “CJK’s global ambition for the world’s open source software market may threaten U.S. technological leadership and could damage U.S.-based companies.”9

his and the forum’s larger open-source mission are framed in opposition to Microsoft—and as part of the Chinese government’s effort to unseat that legacy company’s market, standards, and dominance.

the OSS Forum has focused on cooperation in developing Linux standards.

the OSS Forum engages with international standards bodies, including ISO/IEC JTC 1 and the Free Standards Group.

o “promot[ing] the development of the open source software industry in the three countries and enhancing the status and influence of Northeast Asia in the international open source community and industry.”

However, where the NEAS Forum targets ISO and IEC standards, the CJK-ITSM is more focused on ITU.

the three countries had committed to exploring “solutions to support each other in ISO activities,” as well as the stationing of ISO and IEC management personnel.

the NEAS Forum and its projects are designed to influence international standards and standards organizations, especially ISO and IEC.

CJK-SITE focuses on the standardization activities of ISO/IEC JTC 1, as well as other IEC technical committees covering information technologies and electronics.

hese mechanisms include the Northeast Asia Standards Cooperation Forum (NEAS Forum) and the China-Japan-Korea IT Standards Meeting (CJK-ITSM), as well as more targeted mechanisms like the Northeast Asia Open Source Software Promotion Forum (OSS Forum).

At the 2011 meeting, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) proposed coordination in IPv6 standardization; at the 2018 event, the three sides agreed to coordinate in developing 5G systems.

“while they compete against each other in the arena of international standardization, they need each other to support the development of each other’s standards and to strengthen them in markets, both domestic and international.”7

China also pursues bilateral, multilateral, and regional engagement to shape the direction of other countries’ standards development, lock in recognition of Chinese standards in foreign markets, and drum up support in international standards bodies.

The United States and its allies and partners should establish and fund a new organization composed of government and industry representatives that is dedicated to developing and proposing new standards recommendations in strategic areas.

They should terminate bilateral standards cooperation with the Chinese government and government-controlled entities.

China benefits from the reality that it competes for international standards while other national governments cooperate

Greater transparency

A tit-for-tat competition is unlikely to succeed; instead, an effective response to China’s standards strategy will demand coordination among private- and public-sector actors across not only

China’s size, centralization, and industrial capacity grant it structural advantages in influencing international standards:

It treats technical standards as tools, and sources, of national power, while other countries have historically left the standards contest to commercial players.

The digital revolution has raised the strategic value of standards, and Beijing is competing to set them.

Should those efforts be scaled and combined with standard setting in digital logistics, Alibaba could lock in vertically integrated control over information flows for future trade and the physical goods and systems that will depend on them

For example, Alibaba, the Chinese Ministry of Transport, and the International Port Community Systems Association—an association of sea and air port authorities, port community system operators for both sea and air, and single-window operators—have jointly launched a task force on logistics visibility.6

Once Chinese infrastructure is laid and Chinese equipment is loaded on it, it is only a matter of time before Chinese standards will be used

In 2015, SAC issued the Belt and Road Initiative for Standards Connectivity (2015–17). This was followed by the Action Plan for Standards Connectivity to Build the Belt and Road Initiative (2018–20).

When Chinese entities build infrastructure projects internationally, they tend to do so according to Chinese standards.

eijing’s size and centralization allow it to leverage trade, investment, and industry partnerships to proliferate de facto standards

In August 2020, Tian Shihong, director of SAC, met with DIN’s chair of the executive board. They discussed the ISO Strategy 2030, the digitalization of standards, and the governance of ISO/IEC JTC 1.6

The commission’s work feeds directly into international standards bodies, including ISO and IEC (e.g., ISO/IEC Joint Working Group 21).60

China has secured a close standards partnership with Germany in precisely the emerging domains where Germany excels and which China prioritizes, including advanced manufacturing.

with Germany emphasizes the auto industry

China’s standards engagement with the UK prioritizes smart cities and graphene

ith ASEAN partners, Beijing tends to focus on standards for smart manufacturing, smart cities, autonomous vehicles, and financial information—

The two parties also operate a China-ASEAN standards research center and have identified a set of “major projects for China-ASEAN standards cooperation.”

Beijing channels much of its standards cooperation with ASEAN countries through the regional organization itself.

China reports 98 standardization agreements with 55 different countries

But in China’s case, such cooperation is asymmetric.

he SAC’s Main Points of National Standardization Work in 2008 notes that China should “strengthen exchanges and cooperation with African countries and strive for support from African countries in international standardization activities.”

Huawei proposed a fixed 5G standard in cooperation with ETSI.

At the Reno Conference...almost all Chinese companies coordinated tacitly to support the polar code led by Huawei as a control channel coding standard....This shows strong nationalism. While on the surface, the 5G international standard competition is a competition between technical solutions, at a deeper level, it is dominated by nationalism....This is particularly obvious among Chinese companies.48

to standards also means that the proposals it brings to SDOs tend to align with the strategic interests of the Chinese government and be backed by the broader ecosystem of Chinese actors.

to “submit four Beidou-3 B1C signal technology proposals” to 3GPP.4

companies engage with a centralized platform to develop and hone their standard recommendations before taking them to international standards bodies

of the fifteen 3GPP chairs and vice chairs in open working groups affiliated with Chinese entities, 60% work for state-owned enterprises.

“other countries’ delegates act like individuals. China’s act like a group.”

73 are headquartered in the United States, but that does not mean they coordinate or respond to U.S. national directives.

One of the most important points is interconnection in telecommunications, which both improves the level of interconnection and interoperability of international communications and promotes a new generation of ICT....In the current complex background of the world, the issue of standards in the field of international telecommunications has become one of the focal issues of global governance

for example, an October 2021 meeting of ITU-T Study Group 20, dedicated to IoT and smart cities. This meeting addressed 94 total standards contributions, 53 of which were proposed by Chinese actors. South Korea had the next most contributions with 21.

the branch of ITU responsible for ICT standards, than any other country, with 34 posts out of a total of 225

what that means for tomorrow’s ecosystem.

Beijing’s influence over the international standards ecosystem remains limited.

e that standards bodies are structurally sound and that Beijing—whatever its ambitions—neither does nor will claim disproportionate influence over them.

China’s presence is not outsized relative to the size of its market, nor is it the most significant player in ISO or IEC

This growth in Chinese representation correlates with an increase in Chinese-led standards in ISO and IEC: between 2013 and 2020, these increased by 4.1 times to reach 788.

More empirically, ISO data suggests a correlation between working group chairs and the publication of standards suggested by Chinese players: approximately 50% of ISO technical committees with SAC secretariats published standards recommended by China in 2019 or 2020. Overall, only around 25% of ISO technical committees did.35

These subgroups also have management teams (e.g., secretariats, chairs, and vice chairs) that grant influence over standardization agendas.

takes place in domain-specific subgroups (i.e., technical committees or working groups)

The section also finds that Beijing’s centralization may allow it to take advantage of representation in SDOs in a way that other national governments cannot.

competitive asymmetries that might result.

Participation in SSOs and SDOs tends to be an expensive, laborious, and knowledge-intensive process. Meetings are long and take place all over the world, membership costs can be high, and progress tends to be measured over long-term time horizons.

These include monetary rewards for companies that propose international standards; training for delegates, or “standardization talents”; and financial support to join standardization organizations.32

for “expand[ing] the number of participating members in ISO technical committees or subcommittees.”

The United States tends to follow a market-driven approach: companies form standards of their own volition and through their own partnerships, with little government attention. By contrast, the European Union and its member governments are more involved in the process.27And in China, most standard setting is government-led, and companies and academic entities receive state support for participation in international standardization.2

the ASEAN Consultative Committee for Standards and Quality sits under the purview of the ASEAN economic ministers.

“if you’re an industry, and your standards group wants to make a global standard, ultimately it will have to bubble up to ISO/IEC JTC 1” or ITU

ETSI, Japan’s Association of Radio Industries and Businesses (ARIB) and Telecommunication Technology Committee (TTC), China Communications Standards Association (CCSA), Telecommunications Standards Development Society, India (TSDSI), South Korea’s Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), and the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) of the United States together formed the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) in 1998.

the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) focuses on standards for, as the name suggests, the World Wide Web.

ETSI’s committees cover everything from emergency communications to IPv6.

it has hundreds of individual members representing government, private, and academic sectors

ITU-T develops technical standards to ensure interconnectivity and interoperability of international ICT systems

ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1)

NSBs can be government (e.g., the SAC) or nongovernment (e.g., the American National Standards Institute) entities, or a combination of the two.

Membership for both ISO and IEC is composed of one representative per country, subordinate to that country’s national standards body (NSB)

SO, IEC, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Together, these three organizations constitute the World Standards Cooperation (WSC)

https://joryburson.com/standardization-project.

A standards consultant interviewed for this report describes it as a “rat’s nest.”2

Consortia are like SDOs but focus on specific industry verticals.

nternational standard-developing organizations (SDOs), standard-setting organizations (SSOs), and market-based consortia

“With the birth of the fourth industrial revolution, the international standards competition pattern...has undergone significant changes. The competitive advantage in standards is shifting from developed countries such as the United States to emerging economies represented by China.

“the country that takes the lead in dominance over international standards will enjoy the first-mover advantage in the fourth industrial revolution.

Such integration “can only be realized when a globally consistent international standard is formulated.”

he nature of digital technologies is likely to make standards more strategically significant.

The last industrial revolution proved as much—the United States, Europe, South Korea, and Japan were able to dominate in large part because they controlled international standards.

including the Internet of Things (IoT), artificial intelligence, big data, blockchain, IPV6 (Internet Protocol version 6), new infrastructure, information and information infrastructure security, the industrial internet and intelligent manufacturing, and unmanned aerial vehicles, smart cars, smart ships, smart roads, and smart car data collection.

participate in at least half of all standards drafting and revision in recognized international standard-setting bodies,

In 2015 the State Council issued the National Standardization System Construction and Development Plan (2016–2020).

Beijing sees today’s industrial revolution as a chance to challenge developed economies’ long-standing control of international standards.

The Main Points of National Standardization Work released by the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) in 2008

a non-zero-sum,

The company reportedly stacked delegations with supporters, stuffed ballots, and outright bought votes. This campaign caused an uproar: movements erupted calling on members to vote against OOXML, and IBM threatened to leave ISO and other software-relevant standards bodies. But the campaign also worked, and ISO ratified OOXML.

standards constitute the rules of new-type geopolitical power

entralization allows it to take advantage of that voice, ensuring coordination among its commercial, academic, and government entities—both in developing standards (

Size grants China a significant voice

Beijing benefits from asymmetric structural advantages.

Beijing pursues its standards strategy through international standard-setting bodies, such as the ISO; international investments and commercial footholds, such as infrastructure construction; and regional and national standard-setting organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Association Française de Normalisation.

standards are difficult to uproot.

While Brazil has condemned the invasion at the United Nations, it also this week supported Putin’s presence at the G20 summit in November in Bali amid pressure by the United States and its allies to bar the Russian leader from attending.

“For us, the fertilizer issue is sacred,” he said days after the Russian invasion began on February 24. “We are not going to take sides, we are going to continue with neutrality and help in whatever way possible in search of a solution.”

What is most relevant in this trade between Brazil and Russia is the purchases that Brazil makes of Russian fertilizers.”

“In Indonesian political culture ‘strongmen’ are characteristically autocratic, demagogic and dismissive of democratic processes,” said Wilson. “Many see this in Putin, but not in a figure such as Zelenskyy who is often characterised in commentary as a ‘puppet’ of external forces, despite his emergence as a genuine leader in a time of crisis.”

Writing in a blog for the University of Melbourne, Dharmaputra notes Russia has established a science and culture centre in Jakarta, set up an Indonesian language version of the Russia Beyond the Headlines website and provided scholarships for Indonesian students as well as funding for centres of Russian Studies at Indonesian universities.

“This has had an impact on them questioning the credibility of news sources, in the sense of the US mass media. Many state that they can’t just accept news from the US without reading the other side – but the root of this is their distrust of the US in general,”

“Indonesia needs Russia as an alternative weapon supplier, so it won’t be completely reliant on the US.”

The spirit of NAM continues to inform Indonesian foreign policy, which maintains what it calls a “bebas-aktif” approach to international affairs – an “independent” stance and an “active” role in global governance.

Supply chains held up better during the pandemic than is often assumed, it argues, and greater self-sufficiency is likely to leave countries more vulnerable to future shocks, not less.

a surge in shipping delays, shortages of critical components and soaring prices.

by the emergence of complex supply chains, through which firms could efficiently produce all sorts of goods at low cost and enormous scale