carbon-removal technologies have to pass several tests (besides obvious ones like being safe and legal). One is permanence: the technologies must be able to store the stuff sucked from the air for at least 1,000 years. Another is scalability: they must not have land-use requirements that are in conflict with food security. A third is cost: they must have a path towards a price tag of less than $100 per tonne of carbon dioxide removed (down from hundreds of dollars or more per tonne for existing techniques).

A similar AMC-esque project is expected to be unveiled in May at the annual plutocrat retreat in Davos hosted by the World Economic Forum (WEF).

As well as underestimating Ukraine’s sense of national identity, Mr Putin must have been highly confident in the capability of his armed forces to deliver a quick victory

“misperception”

“Intangible incentives”

Vladimir Putin may have invaded Ukraine to stop it turning West and becoming a successful liberal democracy, an example that could undermine his grip on power

“unchecked interests”

Mr Blattman identifies five “logical ways” why, despite all the reasons to compromise, people opt to fight.

As long as both sides have a realistic appreciation of the huge price of fighting

a call for an “international treaty on pandemic prevention and preparedness” issued in March 2021 by a group of 25 heads of government and NGOs.

“we must act on Covid-19’s lessons and innovate so that we can deliver swift, equitable health solutions to prevent the next pandemic.”

It’s not possible to talk about “AI for everyone” (Google’s rhetoric), “responsible AI” (Facebook’s rhetoric), or “broadly distribut[ing]” its benefits (OpenAI’s rhetoric) without honestly acknowledging and confronting the obstacles in the way.

how AI is impoverishing the communities and countries that don’t have a say in its development—the same communities and countries already impoverished by former colonial empires

Venezuela

In part one, we head to South Africa, where AI surveillance tools, built on the extraction of people’s behaviors and faces, are re-entrenching racial hierarchies and fueling a digital apartheid.

The AI industry does not seek to capture land as the conquistadors of the Caribbean and Latin America did, but the same desire for profit drives it to expand its reach. The more users a company can acquire for its products, the more subjects it can have for its algorithms, and the more resources—data—it can harvest from their activities, their movements, and even their bodies.

a “data colonialism,”

Over the last few years, an increasing number of scholars have argued that the impact of AI is repeating the patterns of colonial history.

The very idea treats languages like a person, with a name, birth date and birthplace. But languages are not like an individual. They are much more like a species, gradually diverging from another over many years. It would be as accurate to describe such jottings as degenerate Latin as it is to call them early Spanish—but that would probably not draw as many tourists.

the Russo-Ukrainian conflict could last in a semi-frozen state for decades, threatening international stability and periodically bursting into renewed fighting. It might even escalate into nuclear confrontation.

Possession of Ukraine has long been essential to Russia’s existence as a great empire; its secession in 1991 sealed the Soviet Union’s fate. Crimea's loss hit Russians especially hard. The great naval base in Sevastopol was vital to Russian power in the Black Sea region and had a unique place in Russia’s historical memory (owed above all to the great sieges during the Crimean and second world wars).

After 1945, the Soviet Union was the surviving empire. Now we are living with the consequences of its collapse.

Much of the Middle East is still living with the consequences of the demise of the Ottoman empire and of the British and French empires that briefly filled part of the void the Ottomans left behind.

America and its allies could, then, suffer considerable pain if they imposed on China the same sanctions they have inflicted on Russia. For that reason, they would probably not dare go that far. But they must hope that China does not dare to find out.

European sanctions, for example, initially spared Russia’s $2.4bn market for luxury goods: the so-called “Gucci exemption”. The same market in China is worth over $50bn a year, according to Statista, a data provider.

China, for its part, might curb exports of the “rare earths” used in many electronic goods. It could disrupt the supply chain for electric-vehicle batteries and other manufacturing niches

China’s biggest source of leverage is its own vast market. America might, for example, wish to deprive it of certain high-tech inputs, such as semiconductors. But a complete ban would cost American semiconductor firms 37% of their revenues, according to Boston Consulting Group, and jeopardise over 120,000 jobs.

China accounts for about 18% of America’s imports and over 22% of the EU’s, including many parts and components used in domestic manufacturing (see chart)

Less than a fifth of China’s trade last year was settled in its own currency. Much of the rest was conducted in dollars.

The combined total is over six times the size of the equivalent foreign holdings in Russia.

At the end of last year, foreigners owned $3.6trn in direct investments, including immovable factories, and $2.2trn in shares, bonds and other “portfolio” investments

China probably keeps about two-thirds of its $3.2trn of foreign-exchange reserves in Western government bonds and the like.

crippling sanctions on Russia’s central bank, removing from its reach about half of its foreign-exchange reserves

“WOULD THE US really dare to freeze or confiscate China’s reserve assets?”

a combination of more clutter and more things to hit could begin a slow-motion chain reaction, in which each collision produces more debris, making future collisions more likely.

The coming decades will require democracies to work together to recreate an international system that privileges their values

The EU GDPR, 2019 Cybersecurity Act, and Digital Services Act

outh Korea initiated the process to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, a plurilateral agreement between Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile intended to strengthen digital trade and establish standards for digital cooperation

the India-Japan memorandum of understanding to enhance cooperation in the field of ICT was signed on January 15, 2021.

Like-minded countries must willingly set aside parochial disputes among themselves, adopt “good enough” solutions, and begin implementing an alternative digital ecosystem that reinforces shared interests and values.

the U.S.-led Clean Network initiative

the March 2020 Australia-Singapore Digital Economy Agreement,

apan’s Data Free Flow with Trust initiative

If the PRC continues to construct its own digital ecosystem, then it should not benefit from a digital ecosystem established around liberal values.

democracies would formalize frictionless data transfers between like-minded states and impose significant data restrictions on authoritarian regimes and their commercial entities.

Germany’s Digitalization Act, passed in January 2021, also targets large U.S. digital platforms and tech companies and will likely prove equally harmful.1

Using comparative advantage within the community of like-minded nations, while denying access and advantage to the PRC, is a more effective approach.

within the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement offer a roadmap for expansion.

Among democracies, localization requirements, data barriers, and discriminatory treatment of digital products, platforms, and components should be removed.

Expand digital trade provisions to include more democracies.

Reaching a consensus should require compromise on the part of all participants.

pursue a common agenda for the application of regulatory and policy tools.

This grouping should include the EU, Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Israel, Canada, Australia, and the United States—nearly 2.5 billion people.

export controls, investment screening, anti-dumping/countervailing duties, and sanctions

Employ coordinated regulatory and policy tools across democracies to provide advantages to like-minded countries while disadvantaging authoritarian regimes and their corporate entities.

The first wave of the digital revolution promised that new technologies would favor democracy and human rights. The second wave saw an authoritarian counterrevolution. And the question now is whether we can engineer a third wave of the digital revolution—a turn in which we forge a democratic technological ecosystem characterized by resilience, integrity, and openness with trust and security, that reinforces our democratic values and our democratic institutions.

Rather than try to persuade the CCP to accept liberal norms and abandon its quest to build a digital ecosystem that reinforces an authoritarian governance model, democracies should set about building an alternative system and exclude the PRC from gaining nonreciprocal access.

Reconstruct a digital ecosystem that reinforces democratic values and the rule of law.

ITU continues to serve an important role in deconflicting radio spectrum and satellite orbits, but its latest efforts to expand into ICT standard setting, AI norms, and facial recognition rules should be resisted.

dvocates for an open civil society should push back against overreach from multilateral bodies in which the PRC has established undue influence.

hey should also bar domestic standards organizations from including, as members, PRC entities that have been designated as tied to the Chinese military, engaged in human rights abuses, or are under CCP control.1

to defend existing domestic and international standards bodies from China’s malign influence.

“We will shape emerging technology standards to boost our security, economic competitiveness, and values. And, across these initiatives, we will partner with democratic friends and allies to amplify our collective competitive advantages.”

Participation by the PRC and other authoritarian regimes must be limited to late-stage negotiations. If the PRC decides to adopt alternative standards, it can do so.

Establish new standard-setting bodies and block PRC influence

Democracies cannot take advantage of science and technology breakthroughs if they lack the comprehensive manufacturing and industrial base to actualize the advances through new products and services that span the commercial and national security spaces.

While the United States, Japan, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan continue to make the most advanced and critical components for electronics, they have largely surrendered the building blocks of these industries and are dependent on the PRC as the principal buyer of advanced components.

prevent the PRC from using industry supply chains to develop coercive leverage.

Rebuild electronics manufacturing outside the PRC.1

he European Innovation Council,

f i g u r e1R&D expenditures of selected countries, 2000–2019s o u r c e: “Main Science and Technology Indicators,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB

has more than tripled over the past two decades, increasing from $677 billion annually in 2000 to $2.2 trillion by 2019

Commit to higher expenditure levels on research and development.

One set of U.S. initiatives that could be emulated is the combination of the 2019 supply chain executive order (EO 13873) and the 2020 creation of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (“Team Telecom”).

our relationship with digital infrastructure starts and ends with our smartphone or Wi-Fi router, which leaves us blind to the myriad of hardware, software, and commercial service providers that operate this system behind the scenes.

how existing frameworks operate

the technological, industrial, and commercial ecosystems that develop, manufacture, and maintain the digital infrastructure that their economies, militaries, and political systems rely on.

Develop a “common operating picture” for the technological, industrial, and commercial systems that create and operate digital infrastructure

.S. adoption of a GDPR-like law is “the first practical step the [United States] should take.

Align data privacy laws

fosters a multipolar community of independent countries, settling disputes through negotiation, transparency, and the rule of law

The Biden Administration is committed to promoting an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet; protecting human rights online and offline; and supporting a vibrant, global digital economy. Certain countries, including the People’s Republic of China, do not share these values and seek to leverage digital technologies and Americans’ data in ways that present unacceptable national security risks while advancing authoritarian controls and interests.

can democratic governments, along with their companies and citizens, build the next generation’s digital operating system to protect global norms, prosperity, and security—even as the CCP seeks to undermine them?

employing regulatory tools like export controls, investment security mechanisms, and restrictions on data and capital flows,

there are existing norms, standards, and infrastructure that can serve as cornerstones.

imagining that convergence and market access are just over the horizon are over.

must abandon the fantasy that the CCP can be persuaded in any meaningful way to drop its challenge to the liberal international order and the digital infrastructure beneath it.

to accept that Beijing’s alternative system and its challenge to the global architecture are a present reality, not a future condition.

he world safe for authoritarianism by legitimizing its governance model,

by interrupting the spread of “Western constitutional democracy,” which in the party’s view has a number of distinct characteristics, including “the separation of powers, the multi-party system, general elections, independent judiciaries, [and] nationalized armies.”

o develop, export, and set the rules of—while maintaining control over—both the physical and digital networks of the fourth industrial revolution.

re-engineer the operating system of the international order into something that advantages Beijing’s regime, advances an illiberal worldview, and provides the party greater control of resources, industry, and information.

the pernicious effects of liberal ideology embedded in the international system.

The incumbent liberal international system was established following World War II. It is based on the Bretton Woods agreements, which promoted efficient foreign commerce, and global norms articulated in the United Nations Charter that center on individual rights, limited government, self-determination, multilateral institutions to negotiate disputes between states, and collective security to deter conflict.

his happens at a time of global reshuffling, catalyzed by the emergence of data as a factor of production, that raises the stakes and severity of the CCP’s challenge.

becoming the “operating system” for a new, illiberal international orde

over both the physical and digital networks of the fourth industrial revolution.

building digital platforms and infrastructure that risk becoming the “operating system” for a new, illiberal international order

new security threats for the United States arising from reduced global dependence on GPS

The dual-use nature of information technology systems means that they can serve commercial ends while propping up a national security system. And throughout, they collect and transfer data—the new, determinative factor of production.

ven five years prior to the completion of BeiDou-3, the system had already started generating $31.5 billion in annual revenue for online clients, including Chinese defense industry conglomerates like CASIC and China North Industries Group Corporation, an arms manufacturer.

“China-Africa Digital Innovation Partnership Program...[to] strengthen digital infrastructure, develop a digital economy, carry out digital education, enhance digital inclusion, co-create digital security, and build a cooperative platform [between China and the nations of Africa].”6

China also helped develop and launch Ethiopia’s first two satellites and provided meteorological satellite data–receiving equipment to Mozambique.

he first “overseas BeiDou [applications research] center” being located in Tunisia. Chinese experts have led BeiDou training sessions in Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco.63

“BeiDou has provided services and related products to more than 100 million users in countries and regions along the Belt and Road and exported [those services and products] to more than 120 countries and regions.”6

The expansion of BeiDou services into countries that have signed on to BRI, and the displacement of GPS in those countries as a result, has been described as a key opportunity for the initiative.

BeiDou is a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Xi Jinping himself has linked China’s rise as a space power to his overarching goal of bringing about “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” claiming that “the aerospace dream is an important component of [China’s] dream of [becoming] a powerful country.”58

In March 2021 the Iranian government signed a 25-year agreement with China granting Iran’s armed forces access to the BeiDou network

Indian media reported that Pakistani authorities intended to adopt BeiDou for both civilian and military purposes, with the country “completely [switching] to the BeiDou navigation system for all its critical military platforms.

he Russian legislature’s passage in July 2019 of a law enshrining cooperation between Russia’s GLONASS system and BeiDou caused concern among some U.S. analysts, given the country’s history of jamming and spoofing GPS signals over large areas

to supplant GPS as the number-one navigation system on (and above) the planet.

the BeiDou-3 constellation

he United States’ use of GPS-guided precision munitions during the 1991 Gulf War and the July 1993 Yinhe incident, during which a Chinese freighter lost its ability to navigate after the United States temporarily suspended GPS coverage over the Indian Ocean.

Chinese state media has identified its navigation services as central to “national defense mobilization,” while also noting applications in consumer smartphones, public transportation, and agricultural monitoring

8 satellites in geostationary orbit, 27 in medium Earth orbit, and 10 in inclined geosynchronous orbit. Another 5 BeiDou-3 experimental satellites—3 in medium Earth orbit and 2 in inclined geosynchronous orbit—also exist within the constellation, albeit on a different signal system

his phase builds on the 15 existing satellites of the BeiDou-2 constellation, which provides navigation services to the Asia-Pacific.

consists of 30 satellites launched between November 5, 2017, and June 23, 2020

The successful launch of the final satellite in the third phase of the BeiDou constellation (hence BeiDou-3) on June 23, 2020, made China the third individual nation (after the United States and Russia) to put a complete satellite navigation system with global reach into orbit.

“The BeiDou-3 Navigation Satellite System is formally commissioned!”

Traditional modes and mechanisms of international competition, such as military deployments and actions in institutions of multilateral governance, are insufficient to address Beijing’s challenge.

the Military-Civil Fusion strategy

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also consolidated control over the management decisions of both state-owned and ostensibly private corporations like Alibaba.

Economic statecraft is traditionally defined in the West as a suite of policy tools, including sanctions, export restrictions, and investment screening.

hey wield significant influence over society and political institutions; retain massive amounts of data globally, including on people; and are the primary incubators of cutting-edge innovations that will define the next era of economic

Corporations are the defining instruments of 21st-century strategic competition.

China’s digital strategy creates the prospect of a Chinese-led digital bloc that operates telecommunications, financial payments, e-commerce, logistics, internet, and satellite navigation separate from the rest of the world.

China’s industrial policy could subvert the incentive structures that underpin innovation—the engine of economic and military power—including the competitive and financial returns inherent in ingenuity and the laws that protect global markets.

to entice foreign companies to establish R&D facilities in China.3

According to Tai Ming Cheung, this policy encourages the “going out” of Chinese firms to gain access to foreign R&D and technology

In October 2021, Tokyo appointed a new minister of economic security to—among other things—counter economic espionage.35

In 2020 the European Commission proposed hiring “civilian spy catchers” to protect research and innovation developed within research universities from being

he cost of PRC IP theft for the U.S. economy at $400–$600 billion a year.

China has developed a systematic approach to identifying, targeting, and acquiring IP and talent from around the world. IP theft erodes the long-term competitiveness of global companies, especially as stolen IP is absorbed and repurposed by Chinese firms to compete in global markets.

Acquisition of foreign IP through both licit and illicit means and the subversion of strategic industries through overcapitalization

across 1,741 guidance funds, including at least $60 billion specifically allocated to the integrated circuity industry via the National IC Industry Investment Fund (Big Fund).

the Big Fund aims to subvert the global semiconductor industry by creating overcapacity, just as China did in the solar and LED industries.

China has invested over $100 billion into the semiconductor industry, while also heavily subsidizing the purchase of Chinese chips domestically and targeting foreign semiconductor firms to acquire IP.

technological capacity requires manufacturing capacity.

“China’s Head Start: CCP Industrial Policy for Global Automotive Ascendance,” Horizon Advisory, June 18, 2021, available at https://issuu.com/horizonadvisory/docs/horizon_advisory_-_china_s_head_star

hina dominates global production of the basket of minerals necessary for emerging technologies, including cobalt, lithium, and nickel

China’s primary Internet of Things module manufacturer, Quectel, controls more than a third of the global market,26

rare earths

In 2018 the U.S. Department of Defense concluded that China poses a “significant and growing risk to the supply of materials deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security.”

China continues to control global rare earth production,

China restricted rare earth exports to Japan in retaliation for disputes over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.

by controlling value chains for emerging industries, which grants coercive leverage.

China’s propaganda and dissemination of disinformation could also help stir up popular unrest or shape voter preferences, skewing the incentives and priorities of democratic governments.

TikTok is owned and controlled by ByteDance, a Chinese company, and in August 2021 the Chinese government, through a state-owned entity, claimed a board seat and stake in ByteDance.20 ByteDance—and through it the Chinese government—are reportedly able to access the information of U.S.-based TikTok users.

hina’s global digital architecture allows it to shape the digital environment—not only to obstruct competitors’ activities

China-Africa Partnership Plan on Digital Innovation to solidify China’s position on the continent,

s of 2021, Huawei alone had built 50% of the African continent’s 3G networks and 70% of its 4G networks.14

Some date Huawei’s first forays into African countries back to 1996.1

hat Chinese hackers were stealing massive amounts of camera footage from the African Union headquarters.

n March 2018, French newspaper Le Monderevealed that between 2012 and 2017 confidential data on an African Union ICT system provided by Huawei had been routed to a server in Shanghai each evening.

ilk Road Information Port Co.,

The company, with support from Guangxi and central government agencies, is driving China-ASEAN network integration and information exchange to promote the Digital Silk Road.

China-ASEAN Information Harbor Company (China Eastcom), a state-controlled information technology company

“new internet exchange” hub in Nanning by China’s three state-owned telecom operators,

The China-ASEAN Information Harbor Digital Economy Alliance represents one such initiative led by the PRC government to form a digital infrastructure ecosystem interweaving China with Southeast Asian nations that could in time serve as a bulwark hindering U.S. commercial pursuits and establishing new standards and norms for digital operators in the region.

the strategic underpinnings of the “going out” of Chinese ICT companies

to undermine the incentives and legal structures that drive Western innovation, chiefly the concept and protection of intellectual property (IP) rights,

to dominate critical nodes in strategic, digital-relevant industry chains and infrastructure and convert them into coercive leverage

to shape the international information environment, including through dissemination of propaganda and disinformation

The use of global digital systems, including commercial platforms, to acquire superior information

A state-driven agenda that forces companies to pursue government interests,

They demand that the United States and other liberal democracies acquire a broader perspective of security and competition, one that accounts for not only traditional military and intelligence concerns and actors but also economic and political ones.

international information environment

China aims to be the first country to merge the components of the digital triad to not only drive economic development and commercial value but also enhance the competitiveness of its diplomatic, military, and intelligence operations

by a mutually reinforcing and interactive “digital triad” of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, big data, and artificial intelligence.

y a mutually reinforcing and interactive “digital triad” of information and communications technology infrastructure, big data, and artificial intelligence.

Reaching an agreement between the United States and EU on the issue of privacy is central to pressuring China to sign onto ambitious data flow provisions that would require it to remove the majority of its localization policies.

Europe wants a broad self-judging exception for privacy, while China wants the same for national security.

binding set of rules to support data flows and prohibit data localization, with narrow, targeted exceptions for privacy and national security.

The United States also needs to devote more staff to actively engage in UN, ITU, and WTO discussions on digital and cyber issues.

The United States and others need to do more to ensure that these issues are addressed in the proper forum and receive greater support, such as digital development assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Huawei’s New IP proposal initially received reasonable support among African countries before they understood its full implications.

the United States needs to broaden its cyber diplomacy engagement and educational outreach

he challenge for the United States and others is to develop and deploy a more coordinated and effective approach to digital policies, such as data privacy, cybersecurity, content moderation, government access to data, and other digital issues, to compete with China’s policies.

The United States and others need to move on from a largely ad hoc response to a detailed and coordinated all-points strategy that responds to China at every forum and level (i.e., country, regional, and multilateral).

a whole-of-government global digital strategy to counter China’s growing and multifaceted efforts to advocate for a top-down, state-controlled internet.

It is possible that China will sign on to ambitious provisions related to data and digital trade if it can get broad self-judging exceptions for national security and other interests that allow it to essentially circumvent the intended impact of these new rules.

whether the final agreement includes tiered commitments, especially for developing countries.

China’s submission shows it wants a broad, self-judging exception for cyber and national security

he EU wants a self-judging exception, but to protect privacy, allowing it to justify data localization in the name of privac

The first centers on how parties negotiate exceptions to rules that protect data flows and prohibit data localization.

that an agreement will have no credibility without data-related provisions.

opposing talks on data and digital trade (it wanted talks to focus on goods-based e-commerce).

China initially opposed the 2017 launch of the WTO’s Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce that was supported by the United States and dozens of other countries.

India also pushed for the self-judging national security exception before ultimately deciding it did not want to join the partnership.

RCEP provisions on data flows are largely symbolic because they are not subject to dispute settlement, thus making them unenforceable, and are weaker than provisions in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, to which China is a party.35

While Brazil has condemned the invasion at the United Nations, it also this week supported Putin’s presence at the G20 summit in November in Bali amid pressure by the United States and its allies to bar the Russian leader from attending.

“For us, the fertilizer issue is sacred,” he said days after the Russian invasion began on February 24. “We are not going to take sides, we are going to continue with neutrality and help in whatever way possible in search of a solution.”

What is most relevant in this trade between Brazil and Russia is the purchases that Brazil makes of Russian fertilizers.”

“In Indonesian political culture ‘strongmen’ are characteristically autocratic, demagogic and dismissive of democratic processes,” said Wilson. “Many see this in Putin, but not in a figure such as Zelenskyy who is often characterised in commentary as a ‘puppet’ of external forces, despite his emergence as a genuine leader in a time of crisis.”

Writing in a blog for the University of Melbourne, Dharmaputra notes Russia has established a science and culture centre in Jakarta, set up an Indonesian language version of the Russia Beyond the Headlines website and provided scholarships for Indonesian students as well as funding for centres of Russian Studies at Indonesian universities.

“This has had an impact on them questioning the credibility of news sources, in the sense of the US mass media. Many state that they can’t just accept news from the US without reading the other side – but the root of this is their distrust of the US in general,”

“Indonesia needs Russia as an alternative weapon supplier, so it won’t be completely reliant on the US.”

The spirit of NAM continues to inform Indonesian foreign policy, which maintains what it calls a “bebas-aktif” approach to international affairs – an “independent” stance and an “active” role in global governance.