1. Jul 2022
    1. Relatives of Al Jazeera reporter Shireen Abu Akleh accused the U.S. of trying to erase Israel’s responsibility for her death

      Relatives of Al Jazeera reporter Shireen Abu Akleh, who was killed while covering an Israeli raid in the occupied West Bank in May, showed their deep disappointment in President Joe Biden in a letter released over his administration’s response to her death.

      They accused the U.S. of trying to deny Israel’s responsibility for her death, saying in an official statement that Israeli fire most likely killed her but that the May 11 shooting in the West Bank was an accident. The family sent a request to Biden for meeting with them when he visits the region, which The White House declined to comment on, alongside with the matters of the letter.

      Palestinian eyewitnesses who claimed they saw she was shot by Israeli forces gained support from a reconstruction made by The Associated Press, investigations by CNN, New York Times, and The Washington Post as well as monitoring by the U.N. human rights office.

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    1. Ukraine state agency publishes cyberattacks statistics

      The State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP) of Ukraine published statistics about the number, targets, and type of cyberattacks since the beginning of the Russian invasion.

      The government and local authorities, defence, finance, commercial organisations, and the energy sector, in that order, were the main targets of the 796 recorded cyberattacks. Information gathering, malicious code, infiltration attempts, and availability were important cyberattack strategies.

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    1. Ukraine warns of massive cyberattack targeting telecommunications operators

      The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has warned about widespread cyberattacks targeting telecommunications providers. The CERT-UA claims it had learned about the mass distribution of emails with the subject 'LIST of links to interactive maps' among Ukrainian media entities. The emails contain malicious attachments and may begin downloading CrescentImp malware if opened

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    1. European mayors fooled into calls with fake Kyiv mayor

      The mayors of several European cities held meetings via video link with a person they thought was the mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, only to find out they were deceived by a deepfake of Klitschko.

      The office of Berlin Mayor Franziska Giffey tweeted Friday night that his conversation with the alleged mayor of Kyiv was ended after his comments raised suspicion.

      A screenshot of the tweet by the office of Berlin Mayor. Source: PNP.de Jose Luis Martinez-Almeida, the mayor of Madrid, likewise cancelled a video call when he suspected he was not speaking with his Kyiv colleague. Meanwhile, Budapest mayor Gergely Karácsony said in a Facebook post that he had also recently been targeted and had ended the call following 'several strange, suspiciously provocative questions’. Meanwhile, Michael Ludwig, the mayor of Vienna, was convinced he had talked with Klitschko and even tweeted that they had a video chat. The tweet was deleted after the official account of the Austrian capital published a statement that Ludwig appeared to be the victim of a ‘serious case of cybercrime’.

      Questions arose whether the fake Klitschko was a deepfake. German investigative journalist Daniel Laufer found an earlier interview with Klitschko on YouTube that served as the digital source material for the scam. Had a deepfake been used, Laufer argues, the video frames would have been altered in ways that no longer matched the YouTube recording. Apparently this might have been an edited version, not a more-sophisticated deepfake.

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    1. Russian hackers accused of launching attacks against targets in Lithuania and Norway

      Several public and private sector websites in Lithuania were temporarily down on Monday following a cyberattack reportedly carried out by a Russian-backed hacking group. The Lithuania National Cyber Security Centre (NKSC) warned of an 'intense ongoing' Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against the Secure National Data Transfer Network, as well as governmental institutions and private companies. Killnet, a pro-Russian group, claimed responsibility for at least some of the attacks, claiming it was in reprisal for Lithuania blocking the delivery of certain products to the Russian outpost of Kaliningrad.

      Meanwhile, in Norway, a DDOS attack targeted a secure national data network, affecting several private and public institutions. According to Norwegian officials, Russian hackers were likely behind the cyberattack, although there was minimal damage, with 'no sensitive information taken’.

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    1. Paradoxically, a digital way to send across continents a person’s list of diagnoses, medical conditions or allergies in a standard, universally accepted terminology and an interoperable format is not available, although it is technically possible, and lures as a hard-to-reach target. If we accept the progressive nature of Digital Healthcare Systems (Martins 2020), chained globalisation in health will mean one thing: Global Digital Health.
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    1. But the predictable is as much a human need as are ruptures from the predictable.
    2. to offer what is so beloved about rules, which is the increase of what Daston terms the “radius of predictability.”
    3. Alice’s Wonderland is a place where the only rule is that the rules will keep changing.
    4. Daston describes how, historically, sovereignty in Europe has been derived from a mix of “divine authority, the patriarchal power of the male head of household over his wife and children, and the power of the conqueror over the vanquished in war.”
    5. Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty as “the power to decide on the exception,”
    6. Rules that allow no exception seem free of human frailty but alien, and unable to admit properly of complexity.
    7. Rules that leave a ruler, or a judge, in charge of interpreting them feel at once humanized and corruptible.
    8. In this way, the nonsense nested within the cadence of sense becomes vivid.
    9. Algorithms, which were closely associated with reason, came to be valued as more ideal than error-prone human judgment.
    10. Daston suggests that rules tend to succeed when they are also norms.
    11. A computer algorithm is an example of a thin rule—long, perhaps, but intended to be deployed without the need of any human thought or intervention.
    12. thin rules “aspire to be self-sufficient.”
    13. they require interpretation, and because examples are given, and because they make room for all sorts of exceptions.
    14. rules were derived from models:
    15. Similarly, the Latin term regula connects both to straight planks used for measuring and building and to a model by which others are measured more metaphorically—the ruler of a nation, say.
    16. Daston helps us see rules (and their neighbors, such as laws and regulations) through the concepts of thickness and thinness, paradigms and algorithms, failures
    17. when reasoning as we would recognize it proves even minimally consequential.
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    1. less than two weeks after CYBERCOM disrupted Trickbot’s operations, Microsoft engaged in operations toward that same end. Microsoft has previously coordinated botnet disruptive operations with the FBI, including the 2013 operations against the Citadel and ZeroAccess botnets and the recent disruption of the Zloader botnet.

      (continuation of the previous comment)

    2. Its Digital Crimes Unit applies legal and technical solutions to identify, investigate, and disrupt malware-facilitated cybercrime and nation-state-sponsored activity.

      This, and the example below, of Microsoft's actions against malicious infrastructure are worth exploring in greater details. Part of it was taking over malicious domains - that is somewhat legal and certainly welcomed. But were there any 'penetrations' and exploits? I doubt so.

    3. Many U.S. private-sector companies have strong corporate incentives to support conformance with proposed prohibitive norms. Some also have the capacity, capability, and legal standing to engage in responsible, exploitation-based activities.

      A very interesting - and, indeed, dangerous - claim that companies have legal standing to engage in 'responsible, exploitation-based activities' against malicious actors.

      Does Microsoft really have legal ground to exploit any system (be in malicious or not) in another state - or even in US? (Not to ask if this goes against its own philosophy against exploiting vulnerabilities and vulnerable systems)

      Do Huawei or Kaspersky have legal grounds to exploit systems in the NL or US - systems that they, or their governments, deem as malicious? What would the US say in such occasion (even if they dismantle C2 based in US - which is, btw, host of majority of malicious C2s)?

      From the US defence perspective, this is, of course, very acceptable. From an international perspective - including legal and diplomatic - this is very problematic. It could actually put private sector actors on list of 'non grata' for many other countries, as they will be seen in breaching sovereignty of states. It is counter-productive.

      This is not to say that such cooperation - and overall 'defence forward' - against malicious actors is a wrong way to go. It is not about 'if', but about 'how': if it is unilaterally done by the US (and allies), it resembles the US political and military dominance of the 21st century - its understanding of a role of international policeman. We have seen where that lead geopolitically.

      It is much better to approach this 'new approach' through garnering broader international support for such actions - even through the UN. It is slower ,but more legit and with less risks for escalations and further political polarisation.

      ||JovanK|| ||Pavlina|| WDYT - from legal and political perspective?

    4. CYBERCOM’s hunt-forward operations enable anticipatory resilience by discovering adversary malware, techniques, tactics, and procedures as well as indicators of compromise and releasing this information through VirusTotal and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) alerts to inoculate U.S. companies from malicious cyber activity.

      This is, however, different from active attacks: this is information sharing, which is - no doubt - very efficient and needed

    5. The FBI itself recently removed the CyclopsBlink C2 malware associated with a Russian APT-built botnet off of thousands of devices before it was activated toward malicious ends. It also closed the external management ports being exploited to access the C2 malware.

      Another useful example

    6. or example, to preclude technical disruption and interference in the 2020 U.S. elections, CYBERCOM reportedly engaged in an operation to temporarily disrupt what was then the world’s largest botnet: Trickbot.

      Useful example

    7. The U.S. Department of Defense’s defend forward cyber strategy as operationalized by U.S. Cyber Command’s (CYBERCOM) doctrine of persistent engagement embodies the notion of achieving security through responsible, persistent exploitation-based operations, campaigns, and activities.

      Link to US 'defence forward'

    8. Cultivating conformance through a cyber persistence-based approach should aim to coordinate campaigns among government agencies with cyber capabilities and authorities and, where possible, with private-sector actors that have legal standing to engage in such behavior

      Another explanation of 'cyber persistence' concept

    9. overt naming and shaming, which seeks to exert such pressures to achieve conformance, may be counterproductive to stability

      Valid point - naming and shaming attacks a reputation (and often without publicly valid evidences), which doesn't help de-escalation

    10. Covert operations scholarship suggests that secrecy dampens risks of instability by reducing potential pressures from domestic or other audiences and by allowing states to manage reputational concerns. Leveraging the “open secrecy” of persistent cyber campaigns is thus not just a more promising approach but also a more prudent one.

      Interesting point on covert operations, and the importance of reputation! When it comes to espionage and eventually striking malicious infrastructure, this may make sense. But if the strike spills over to an infrastructure that is critical or public (say: adversaries use a hijacked public infrastructure of a country - a hospital network or other - as part of their C2) covert wouldn't be covert any more, and could actually be both embarrassing and dangerous.

    11. It is time better spent tacitly communicating to the malicious source by exposing, disrupting, and contesting threatening behaviors.

      One 'problem' with many such analysis is that they only observe the US perspective. This is not healthy even from the military point of view, and let alone from diplomatic point of view (norms) which should strive towards a compromise.

      Let's put ourselves in the shoes of Russians, or Chine. For them, the threat is not cyber groups, but Microsoft, for instance. Microsoft is vulnerable; Microsoft is dominating the market and imposing solutions; Microsoft is engaging against their sovereignty... Whether we agree or not with this stand, we have to understand their view. Using this strategy, Russians would legitimately act against a threat to them: Microsoft. Or Cyber peace institute. Or any other institution which they deem causes a threat to them.

      If we 'legitimise' intrusion into other systems as defence, it may have a counter-effect of escalations, and setting erroneous precedents.

    12. revealing publicly indicators and warnings of malicious activity, the techniques, tactics, and procedures associated therewith, and malicious malware itself that was discovered after an opponent’s intrusion or in anticipation of one

      This is a second part of suggested strategy - besides attacking malicious actors: it boils down to publishing the know details about the threat actor and threat infrastructure, and sharing all this intelligence among various actors. This info exchange indeed is a cornerstone of better protection.

    13. set security conditions in one’s favor by exploiting adversary vulnerabilities and reducing the potential for exploitation of one’s own

      This might look meaningful from the US perspective. But if you would put this in the mouth of, say, Russians - the US would be heavily against it. So 'it is in the eye of a beholder'. It is rather a military (zero-sum) than a diplomatic strategy (win-win).

    14. exploiting and then closing a vulnerability for the sole purpose of removing malicious malware

      In theory, this looks smart: you attack the attackers. There are good examples of successful campaigns (also illustrated below).

      In practice, it is not so smart: any exploitation of an existing vulnerability involves developing an exploit - usually a sophisticated one, if developed by the US security services, say. That exploit can leak (as we have seen before, from CIA stockpiles), and can get in hands of malicious actors including petty criminals (we have seen that as well).

      That's why 'closing a vulnerability' is done to prevent? Can't work. Even though 'zero days' are most dangerous ones, most exploited vulnerabilities are actually years (and even decades long) - a CISA list of most exploited vulnerabilities, which it publishes regularly to motivate CI sector to patch, shows just that. Thus there is no way to instantly close an old vulnerability around the world (even in US) - and creating a powerful exploit for it doesn't help at all. If it is about a zero-day exploit, it is certainly welcomed that it would be reported to a vendor which would immediately patch it - but again, the existing exploit is even more dangerous, since patching process will take years.

      In a word - very dangerous strategy.

    15. persist and responsibly leverage exploitation-based activities that preclude, inhibit, or otherwise constrain behaviors inconsistent with proposed prohibitive norms.

      Basically using activities that inhibit irresponsible behaviour

    16. cyber persistence, which manifests as a threat through the malicious exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities.

      new concept explained below - basically, 'defence forward' ie a) attacking malicious groups and infrastructure preemtively and b) sharing publicly information about those structures and attacks

    17. All three mechanisms have a poor track record, in isolation and in combination, for cultivating conformance by malicious state and non-state actors with proposed prohibitive peacetime cyber norms.

      Gut-feeling is that this is right - there is no high adherence to cybernoms. Here, an Oxford article is added to support this argument

    18. Martha Finnemore and Duncan Hollis outline three discrete mechanisms for cultivating conformance: persuasion, socialization, and incentives (positive and negative inducements).

      Useful resource by respected authors in the field: three ways that conformance is cultivated now - persuasion, socialisation, and incentives

    19. Unlike the U.N. GGE and OEWG products, the GCSC report proposes prohibitive norms addressing ongoing destabilizing behaviors.

      Good point that GCSC norms are more 'down to earth' and reflect actual problems

    20. States are engaging in a range of cyber behaviors that undermine peace and stability, but these proposed prohibitive norms do not address those behaviors. There is no reported instance of states engaging in cyber operations against another state’s cyber emergency response teams or using their teams for malicious purposes. And, although states have targeted critical infrastructure in armed conflict and non-state actors have done so in peacetime, the proposed prohibitive norms are not framed in a manner addressing that context or those actors, respectively.

      Interesting observation: that current prohibitive norms of GGE/OEWG actually mis-shoot. Example on CERTs is a good one: while this norm is important - it doesn't reflect the reality (there were no documented cases. The one on CI, however, doesn't stay: this is the major issue between US and Russia - it is a valid norm.

    21. Interesting blog that comments on lack of conformance of states to cyber norms: that OEWG/GGE norms don't reflect the reality of attacks, while GCSC which reflect better are not in the game; and on three ways conformance is currently cultivated (persuasion, socialization, and incentives) - all three failing.

      Then, it proposes 'a new way' which should complement this process of turning norms into customary law - by inhibiting the ability for misbehavior/irresponsible behaviour . This should be done through 'defence forward': actively disrupting malicious groups and their systems (malware, botnet C2 infrastructure, etc) before they strike (includling through exploitation of vulnerabilities!), and publicly disclosing the information about such operations. To them, this would support better conformity to norms (by preventing them to misbehave?)

      There is a number of valid points in the doc. But, there are also many problematic ones; to start with - do you, by preventing someone to misbehave, actually promote adherence to norms? Or are these two distinct issues - norms, and defence/military strategy.

      I added number of comments throughout.

      ||Pavlina|| ||AndrijanaG|| ||JovanK||

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    1. There are also overlaps with the eu’s Global Gateway scheme, launched in December to “mobilise” €300bn ($340bn) in infrastructure investment by 2027, and Britain’s Clean Green Initiative, unveiled a month earlier with a pledge of £3bn ($4.1bn) for sustainable infrastructure in developing countries.
    2. t is a repackaging of an idea called Build Back Better World that was launched at the group’s summit last year.
    3. the Partners in the Blue Pacific pact, aimed at offsetting Chinese influence in the Pacific islands.
    4. by focusing on “soft” infrastructure where they have comparative advantages, Western countries aim to boost exports of their own technology and services in areas such as 5g telecoms, blockchain and clean energy.
    5. the Global Development Initiative, which is expected to focus more on sustainable development.
    6. Western officials say the scheme will not compete directly with the bri, which has focused on ports, railways and other “hard” infrastructure. Instead, it will try to play to the g7’s strengths by prioritising climate and energy security, digital connectivity, health and women’s equality.
    7. the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (pgii)
    8. On June 26th the rich democracies of the g7 unveiled a plan to mobilise $600bn of private and public investment in infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries over the next five years
    9. And every time America criticised China’s “new Silk Road”, the riposte came: “What are you offering instead?”
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    1. The party can probably tighten security in its own internal networks. But governing in China, as elsewhere, is all about priorities. And continued surveillance over its own citizens will remain far more important to the authorities than protecting those citizens’ data.
    2. the party’s competence.
    3. The hashtag “data leak” was blocked on Weibo, a microblog, soon after news started to circulate. Discussion on WeChat, a messaging app, is also constrained.
    4. “China is a dictatorial state but that does not mean the state can do anything it likes, because individuals are going to get a bit angry,”
    5. the law is enforced less strictly on officialdom, and there is little evidence of any change.
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    1. The document is ridiculously broad. It says the state should “promote the culinary and gastronomic heritage” of Chile and recognise “spirituality as an essential element of the human being”. Everyone has a “right to sports”. Non-humans get a look in, too: the state “will promote an education based on empathy…for animals”.
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    1. Title: Resolution on Safeguarding Humanitarian Data

      Resolution on Safeguarding Humanitarian Data addresses the centrality of data for humanitarian actions. It reiterates previous initiatives and resolutions of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

      Here are a few key points from the resolution:

      • unauthorised access to data could undermine the principle of impartiality of humanitarian organisations;
      • states and other actors should respect humanitarian purpose of data;
      • work on a digital emblem as a sign to identify data of humanitarian organisations;
      • apply humanitarian principles online as it is done offline.

      Data breaches put humanitThe data breach against the Movement discovered this year has highlighted a growing trend in cyber-operations targeted at humanitarian organisations. Data breaches risk causing severe consequences for the people those organisations serve – those that are already among the most vulnerable. The Movement will reaffirm its commitment and responsibility to implement data protection rules and cyber security measures. It will also emphasize the urgency of protecting humanitarian data and send a call from the Movement to States and other actors to protect humanitarian organisations online as they do offline.

    2. n particular,expert communities, researchers and the privatesector –to work withand supporthumanitarian organizationsto develop or acquire the necessary tools
    3. calls onStates and other actors to respect and protect impartial humanitarian organizations online as they do offline, including by safeguarding them from harmful cyber and information operations of any kind
    4. n the datasecurity and personal data protection measures taken by Movement components
    5. researching the technical feasibility of a digital emblem –namely,a distinctive emblemor signto identify the dataand digital infrastructure of organizationsand entities
    6. impartial humanitarian organizations’ activities must be respectedand protected online as well as offline
    7. may erode trustin impartial humanitarian organizations
    8. that Statesand other actors respect the humanitarian purpose of such dataprocessing
    9. mitigate the risk of data breaches,so that the peoplewhose data is being processed,
    10. to adopt cyber security measures and data protection practices to
    11. the Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Actionand the Restoring Family Links Code of Conduct on Data Protection, and for protection frameworks,such as those in the Professional Standards for Protection Work
    12. related to the safeguarding of people’s privacyanddignity and their safety
    13. to trust humanitarian organizations with their personal data
    14. impartial humanitarian organizations to process personaldata and sensitive non-personal data (humanitarian data) is critical toand an integral part oftheirability to deliver humanitarian activities
    15. extraction of data being processed(forexample,collected, stored or transferred)by impartialhumanitarian organizationsundermines their work
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    1. the broad refusal to recognize the right of the West to lead means there will no longer be a world order based on Western rules.
    2. the specter of China looms – a systemic competitor to the West and, even better, an accomplice of ‘the Russians’.
    3. the former third world is becoming more demanding and picky
    4. it has now completely lost the desire to share its advantages.
    5. former third world today have money, skills, and to some extent, technology.
    6. it is difficult for the West to offer the leading countries of the rest of the world anything that would force them to radically change their positions.
    7. And almost in parallel with the events in Europe, Modi participated in a virtual BRICS summit, and Argentina, it seems, together with Iran, has applied to join this emerging association.
    8. it’s not about sympathy for Russia, but antipathy to the West.
    9. The reason is not support for Russia’s actions, but opposition to the West’s attempts to impose its will on others, which often harms their own interests.
    10. their irritation with the West as a whole
    11. What did you expect would happen when you provoked the tiger?’
    12. wars on the planet have never stopped, including in the last 30 years, and statements from the EU states about the era of ‘harmony and prosperity’ that Putin interrupted are perceived as both selfishness and hypocrisy
    13. harsh methods and humanitarian consequences of the conflict do not elicit much sympathy from outside. In other words
    14. few people approve of Russia’s actions in Ukraine
    15. he Western media still has a near-monopoly on determining the picture of what is happening on a global scale.
    16. no one has yet come close to the Western world in terms of well-being and comfort.
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    1. He called on nations to join China’s new Global Security Initiative and its Global Development Initiative, two loosely defined campaigns.
    2. The country’s policies were “coercive,” its cyberoperations “malicious” and its rhetoric “confrontational.”
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    1. In the run-up to any Cop, negotiations are largely handled by technical specialists in the initial phases, with ministers typically getting involved at the end of talks.
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    1. This notion strongly reflects Japan’s long-standing philosophy of supporting self-help efforts for development cooperation and translates it into Africa’s context.
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    1. The market is bigger and more visible than ever before, encompassing hundreds of companies selling surveillance tech globally. One of the industry’s top trade shows, ISS World, recently held a show in Prague, and it was bigger than ever on both the company and government delegation sides. Calls from every conceivable corner to regulate the industry internationally have largely failed. As a result, there is still little global transparency or accountability for abuse despite increased attention on the problem.
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    1. A strengthened and more secure data sharing framework that clarifies ambiguity on liability and ownership when transferring data will protectpeopleand businesses;it will alsohelp build trust and acceptance in twinning technologies
    2. Using standards to ensurethattwinning technologies and infrastructures are interoperable will also enabletheintegration of EU partnersin the implementationprocess
    3. The EU must developa more strategic approach to international standardisation activities in relevant global formats.
    4. EU policymakingshouldfurther exploit the useof digital solutions,such as digital twins, artificial intelligence for forecasting,ormodelling in impact assessments.
    5. Social dialogue, investments for quality job creation, and timely development of partnerships between public employment services, trade unions, industry and educational institutions are key.
    6. Green anddigital diplomacy and outreach,leveraging the power of regulation and standardisation and promoting EUvalues,should be stepped up.
    7. Rules-based multilateralism and values-based international cooperation should be prioritised.
    8. The work of the EU Observatory of Critical Technologiesand a periodic review process will be important in the context of current and future risks of (technological) strategic dependencies.
    9. the role of the EU in shaping global standards, and the voice of EU companies in regional standard setting bodies, will remain key.
    10. Data standards will play an important role in ensuring that the exponential increase in the volume from different origins and private data
    11. Standardswill beimportant forenabling the twinning.
    12. Further digitalisation, accelerated by COVID-19, will also affect conditions and patterns of work, as well as access tosocial protection.
    13. will be fair or will not be
    14. currently the richest 10% of Europeans emit per capita more than three timesas much as the rest of Europe’scitizens.50
    15. This entails reorientingthetraditionalview ofeconomic progresstowards a more qualitative one evolving around wellbeing, resource efficiency, circularity,and regeneration.
    16. Boese, V., et all (2022).Democracy Report2022: Autrocratization Changing Nature? Varieties of Democracy Institute, V-DEM
    17. This is relevant, as the last 30 years of democratic progress has been eradicated46: the average level of global democracy in 2021 is down to its 1989 level.
    18. pursuing a value-based approac
    19. rivalriesbased on values and societal modelsare alsoexpected to grow.
    20. n quantum computing 50% of the top companies are in the US, 40% in China and none in the EU. In 5G, China captures nearly 60% of external funding, the US 27%, Europe 11%. In artificial intelligence, the US captured 40%, Europe 12% and Asia (including China) 32%. In biotech in 2018–20, theUS spent $260 billion, Europe $42 billion, China $19 billion. McKinsey Global Institute (2022). Securing Europe’s future beyond energy.
    21. the EU could meet 52% of lithium demand, 49% for nickel and 58% for cobalt in 2050 for electric mobility by recycling end-of-life batteries.
    22. For instance, after 2040, recycling could be the EU’s major source of supply for most transition metals, together with the continued need for primary metals.
    23. Beyondthe access to critical raw materials, the ability to setenvironmental and socialstandards, ensuring the sustainability ofmining, refining, and recyclingactivities, and production of energy, will be key in the new geopolitical context.
    24. a 3500% increase in the use of lithium, akey component for electric mobility. Chile currently holds 40% of lithium deposits, while China hosts 45% of itsrefining facilitiesworldwide.
    25. China alone accounts for 86% of the global supply of neodymium. Palladium is mostly provided by Russia (40%), and tantalum by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (33%).
    26. EU’s own productionaccountsfor only 4% of the global supply chain of critical raw materials used in the production of digital equipment, such as palladium, tantalum,or neodymium.
    27. the EU’sdependence on third countries, including China,for a number of critical raw materials is even greater than thaton Russia for fossil fuels
    28. oaring energy and food pricesand related social implications, the potentialneed totemporarily increasetheuse of coal, further pressure on public finances,higher inflation rates, increased cyber risks,issues withsupply chains,andimpaired access to critical raw materialsand technologies.
    29. igital twins will provide data to manage thediversification of products and use functional biodiversity to redesign pestcontrol
    30. ood security or the greening of the sector, and while tacklingfood insecurity in low-income partner countries
    31. In the new geopolitical context, the EU needsto reduce its dependence on import of feed, fertilisers,and otherinputs
    32. Availability of anonymised data, smartappliances, as well asconsumer behaviour will enable targeted investments in renovations.
    33. n the EU,thissector currently accounts for 40% of energy consumption, while 75% of the building stock is energy inefficient.3
    34. Uptake of digital solutions by the industrial sectorrequires higher levels of technologicalreadiness and cybersecurity to protect the data of industrial processes and the integrity of their functioning.
    35. Data-driven optimisation will help improve existing materials, develop greener alternatives,and prolong their lifetime.
    36. Four energy-intensive industries –steel, cement, chemicals, pulp,and paper –account for around 70% of its total global CO2 emissions.
    37. digital platforms will boost other options such as pooling and sharing.
    38. The use of data from vehicles and their environment can optimise charging
    39. 'Energy-as-a-service'21and data-driven innovative energy services canchangethe way energy suppliers and consumers interact.
    40. Digitalisationcan strengthen the EU’senergy security.
    41. For example, 5G and 6Gwill require users to replace equipmentto fully reap their benefits,as most existing smartphones, tablets, and computers would only be backwardscompatible.
    42. currently only 17.4% of this is properly treated and recycled
    43. On the other hand, deployment of next generations of low-power chips11and moreefficient connectivity technologies (5G and 6G, networkspowered by artificial intelligence) might reduce the overall footprint of ICT.
    44. Power consumption will also rise due to the increaseduse of online platforms, search engines, virtual reality concepts such as the metaverse10, andmusic or video streamingplatforms.
    45. theDigital Twin of the Ocea
    46. Thedevelopment of the EUDestination Earth (DestinE)and itsdigital earth twins is key to predicting the effects and building resilience to climatechange.
    47. nformation and communications technology(ICT)isresponsiblefor5-9% of globalelectricity use and around3%of greenhouse gas emissions.
    48. the greening of data-based technologies, such asbig data analytics, blockchain,andthe internet of things
    49. climate neutrality and energy efficiency for data centres and cloud infrastructures by 2030
    50. Space-based data technologies providing real-timeglobal information monitor progress towards sustainability.

      ||sorina||||nikolabATdiplomacy.edu||

    51. Digital product passports enableenhanced material, componentand end-to-end traceabilityand make data more accessible
    52. monitoring, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas emissions for carbon pricing.
    53. resource efficiency and strengthen the flexibility of systems and networks.
    54. ten key areas where action will be needed.
    55. Digital CompassandFit for 55
    56. While they are different in nature and each subject to specific dynamics, theirtwinning–i.e. their capacity to reinforce each other–deservescloser scrutiny.
    57. on the interactions between the green and digitaltransitions
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    1. Governments also fret about privacy breaches, which is even more sensitive than usual when it comes to medical information.
    2. Another Alphabet subsidiary, Verily, is working with L’Oréal, a French beauty giant, to better understand how ageing impacts the biology of the skin—and thus create better skincare.
    3. ageing should be viewed not as an immutable aspect of life but as a condition that can be managed and treated,
    4. to slow the ageing process—or stop it altogether.
    5. Alphabet’s ai projects are also beginning to produce results. Starting in 2016 DeepMind, a British startup bought by Google in 2014,
    6. The fda’s stamp of approval for the Fitbit sensor is a big deal.
    7. Google launched itself into the wearables business in 2019 with a $2.1bn acquisition of Fitbit.
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    1. Through engagement with user communities, GEO will play a key role in systematically: identifying data needs while advocating the provision of, and access to, multiple sources of data; delivering tools, skills and services to allow the intelligent exploitation of the data by the user communities; and showcasing the value of Earth observation data in order to expand interest in, and usage of, those observations, as well as demonstrate their benefits to society.
    2. on the ability of expert communities to utilize complex data from Earth observations and combine these with social and economic analyses.
    3. The extraordinary monitoring capabilities of the countries and organizations that participate in GEO afford decision-makers an unprecedented opportunity to gain foresight about critical factors that impact our future
    4. Earth observations are an opportunity tosupplement statistical analyses in the assessment of indicators towards the attainment of the SDGs and thus have a critical role to play in support of SDG monitoring frameworks.
    5. Earth observations from diverse sources, including satellite, airborne, in-situplatforms, and citizen observatories, when integrated together, provide powerful tools for understanding the past and present conditions of Earth systems, as well as the interplay between them. These tools, and the improved knowledge they provide, together with socio-economic data describing the human dimension in the global environment, can help solve problems, address and mitigate risks, and deliver skillful predictionsof the future behaviour of Earth systems.
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    1. The Russian media would be right to increase coverage of developments in the key non-Western nations, educating the Russian elite and the broader public about the economic realities, politics, and culture of those nations.
    2. Apart from economics, student exchange programs should be expanded, and Russian tourism encouraged to move east, and south
    3. Being an ambassador to Indonesia should be more prestigious than an ambassadorship in Rome, and a post in Tashkent should be viewed as more important than one in Vienna.
    4. From Indonesia to Brazil, and from Argentina to South Africa, there are many dynamic and ambitious countries that Moscow is seeking to engage.
    5. capitulating to the West is no option for Russia, at this point. Things have gone too far.
    6. that people start doing the right thing only when there are no other options.
    7. the dominant cult of individual self-expression, runaway liberalism that is turning increasingly oppressive, the erosion of family values and the proliferation of genders, jars with the more traditional cultural code of the majority of the Russian population.
    8. Despite the recent political rupture and the geo-economic shift, the foundations of Russian culture remain definitely European.
    9. Russians have traditionally identified themselves with the rest of Europe. Christianity; the legacies of Ancient Greece and Rome; the ideas of French Enlightenment and German philosophy; European literature and the arts, music, and dance –
    10. in cultural terms
    11. This, too, is on the way out, however.
    12. Second, Moscow’s economic relations have been largely built with the West.
    13. Russia’s political rupture with the West is thus complete, and any new norm of relations between them can only emerge as a result of the “Hybrid War,“ which will take years, if not decades, to fight out.
    14. At least since the days of Peter the Great, Russian elites have looked westward, adopting western ways of appearance and behavior (while remaining distinctly Russian beneath the garb and manners); adapting western institutions (even if often only superficially); borrowing western patterns of thinking (while creatively developing them, as with Marxism); seeking to become a great European power; then, in Soviet days, a global superpower; and, more recently, a key component of a greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

      Is Russia ending its 'western phase'?

    15. Having tried, after the end of the Cold War, to become part of the new West, and having failed at that endeavor, Russia is now focusing on developing its ties with Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
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    1. We might have to live in the ruins of the old order for quite some time, without anything new being constructed.
    2. the discrediting of communism by the 1970s (if not before) was a boon for neoliberals, who then also – a point Gerstle underplays – used international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation to entrench their beliefs in a global order
    3. Trump promised to restore white supremacy; Sanders thundered that the Obama administration, still dominated by Nineties neoliberals like Larry Summers, had been soft on finance after 2008.  
    4. Clinton and House speaker Newt Gingrich – worked together behind the public scenes of political and personal invective to give Silicon Valley the lax internet legislation it craved.

      There were regulations in the Silicon Valley.

    5. While Clinton and Blair were cheerleaders for technology and globalisation, it is harder to see that their stances really amounted to cosmopolitanism in any meaningful sense: borders might have become more porous, but hardly “open”
    6. the original liberal “promise of emancipation”
    7. precisely because they prioritised freedom, rather than equality, socialists would now build welfare states that provided the security needed for the unfolding and flourishing of individuality
    8. broad continuities between 19th-century liberal ideals of autonomy and individuality and contemporary neoliberalism.
    9. the consumer is not immortal when car manufacturers neglect safety for profit, as Nader’s famous 1965 book, Unsafe at Any Speed, argued.    
    10. corporate America’s selective appropriation of creativity and all its talk of diversity does not prove that left-wing radicals inadvertently helped establish the neoliberal order.
    11. cannot be established without an appeal to moral ideals.
    12. n the 1980s, Ronald Reagan proved the “ideological architect” of neoliberalism, but Bill Clinton, writes Gerstle, played the role of “key facilitator” – the Eisenhower of the centre left, acquiescing in the neoliberal order.  
    13. was a form of “cosmopolitanism” more akin to libertarianism: a supposedly “deeply egalitarian and pluralistic” belief in “open borders” and diversity resulting from different people freely mixing
    14. Thatcher was calling for people to be responsible for themselves, with the help of strong families and the “living tapestry” of something like civil society
    15. “Order” here is a term of art; Gerstle defines it as “a constellation of ideologies, policies, and constituencies that shape American politics in ways that endure beyond the two-, four- and six-year election cycles”.
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